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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
“As the human mind becomes more developed, more enlightened, as 
new discoveries are made, new truths discovered, and manners and 
opinions change, with the change of circumstances, institutions (to) go 
hand in hand with the progress of the human mind.” 
Thomas Jefferson on the need for “laws and institutions” 
 
1.1 Scope and Purpose  
Many of the major policy challenges facing governments today are in some sense 
collective problems calling for joint solutions. This is the case of many environmental 
problems, where their causes and consequences cross political borders. In nearly every 
case, states have organized their responses to such transboundary environmental 
problems via international agreements1 (Victor et al.1998:1). The mere existence of a 
framework for international cooperation is, however, not always sufficient to ensure 
the implementation of the regimes’ rules and regulations. Countries differ in their 
capacity to undertake activities to meet their obligations and the objectives under the 
convention. Regimes, therefore, frequently acquire increased organizational capacity, 
and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) often assume increasingly important roles 
in implementing and operating regimes as the social practices they launch become 
more and more complex (Young.1997:280).  
 
The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) represents one such organizational response 
in the field of the environment. The GEF is an international financial organization that 
serves as the financial mechanism for four international environmental conventions2. 
GEF grants support projects in developing countries related to biodiversity, climate 
change, international waters, land degradation, the ozone layer, and persistent organic 
pollutants. 
 
                                                 
1 140 environmental agreements have been concluded since the beginnings of the 1920s, more than half of these were 
adopted after 1973 (Keohane et al.1993:6). 
2 The four international conventions are the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), the 
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), the Convention on International Waters, and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants (POPs). 
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The subject of this thesis is the GEF as the financial mechanism for the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). The purpose of the thesis is 1) to 
evaluate and 2) to explain the effectiveness of the GEF operating within the climate 
change-regime. The primary aim is therefore not to test or develop any theories, but to 
evaluate and explain an empirical phenomenon. Consequently, theory will be 
employed as a tool for the analysis. Furthermore, this study will be a two-stage 
process. First I will attempt at evaluating or measuring the GEF according to several 
specified indicators, thereafter I will try to explain the results I arrive at.     
 
1.1.1 Why the GEF? 
There are several features to the GEF that makes it an interesting subject for a master 
thesis. First and foremost, the unique mandate the GEF enjoys in international 
relations. It became the only multilateral environmental fund when it was established 
as a three-year pilot facility in 1991. It gained independent status in 1994, and has 
since then become the major funding mechanism for environmental conventions. 
Secondly, the GEF is differentiated from other international organizations by its sole 
focus on global environmental benefits. These benefits are to be achieved through 
activities in developing countries, making them recipients of GEF funds3. The 
developed countries, on the other hand, are donor countries expected to (partly) 
finance GEF’s activities.  
 
GEF’s unique mandate under the Convention is set within an equally unique and 
complex organizational environment. Both its governance system and organizational 
design make it a hybrid between the Bretton Woods and the UN system. Although the 
GEF is an independent international organization, it is also based on existing 
organizations, its’ Implementing Agencies (IAs). The World Bank, the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) are responsible for the actual implementation of GEF-financed projects4. 
                                                 
3 Countries with economies in transition are also recipients of GEF funding, they will not be included in this study as they for 
the purpose of the Convention are included in the group of developed countries. 
4As of 2002 five Regional Development Banks and two other agencies have been approved as GEF Executing Agencies, 
authorising them to implement small GEF projects in developing countries. I will not look into the operations of these 
agencies, as their connection to the GEF family is of such recent date.   
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Many GEF-projects also entail complex collaboration among donor and recipient 
governments, NGOs, scientific and technical organizations, and the private sector. 
Implementation on GEF’s part is limited to the development of operational strategies 
and programs, engaging in project preparation, project approval and the allocation of 
financial resources. The World Bank supports GEF administratively and acts as 
Trustee of the GEF Trust Fund. The purpose behind the creation of this new facility, 
and my reasoning for investigating its contributions to the management of the climate 
change problem, is that 
 
The GEF by exploring cost-effective approaches to global environmental 
investments, should make it possible to move more rapidly in translating the 
objectives and commitments of global conventions into specific operational 
and funding activities (Kjørven.1992:53).  
 
Given the many actors involved in GEFs operations and the scope of a master thesis, it 
will not be possible to include all of the GEF entities in my investigation. This thesis 
will mainly concentrate on the GEF and its’ responsibilities under the FCCC. 
 
1.1.2 Why the FCCC? 
The reasoning behind the decision to focus on the FCCC is threefold; firstly I find it 
necessary to limit my research to one of the four Conventions. Secondly, the two main 
areas for GEF funding are climate change and biodiversity, receiving 40 percent each 
of GEF’s financial resources. Lastly, the timeframe of which the GEF has been 
operating as a mechanism for the conventions, the other conventions were not adopted 
until recently, whereas the FCCC designated responsibility to the GEF already during 
the convention-negotiations (in 1992-94). The FCCC was officially adopted in March 
1994 and the overall objective of the FCCC is  
 
“The stabilization of greenhouse gas (ghg) concentrations in the atmosphere at 
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system” (Article 2 of the FCCC).  
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The FCCC does, however, stress the imbalance in capabilities between the North and 
the South, referring to the special circumstances of developing countries. 
 
“The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement 
their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective 
implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the 
Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology and will 
take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty 
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country 
Parties” (Article 4.7 of the FCCC). 
 
The GEF was therefore devised to serve as the Convention’s financial mechanism to 
meet the need for resource transfer to the developing countries. This study will assess 
the extent to which the GEF, as an IGO within the climate-regime, has played what 
Underdal et al. (1998:74) refer to as an important “enabling role” with regard to 
countries not yet disposing the relevant technical, administrative and financial 
capacity. 
 
1.2  Theory  
Since there is no theory that fully covers the intertwined work of environmental 
regimes and their intergovernmental organizations, I have chosen the approach of 
regime theory. This is not arbitrary since regimes that involve functional 
differentiation among the participants usually exhibit a higher degree of 
institutionalisation, and the part that targets different actor behaviour often operates 
within a larger institutional network (Levy et al.1995:275). The theoretical 
contribution of Underdal, chapter two in Miles et al. (2002), serves as point of 
departure for the theoretical framework, but the theory has been modified, by 
incorporating the work of others, to fit the aim of this thesis. Since the subject of this 
thesis is the GEF, and not the entire FCCC-regime, I will not discuss the term 
“regime” extensively. For now it will suffice to quote the most cited definition 
attributed to Stephen Krasner who states that regimes are “principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given 
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issue-area” (1982:186). The concept of IGOs, on the other hand, deserves a brief 
presentation.  
 
IGOs are distinguished from regimes, in that they are physical entities and as such, 
provide actors with an institutional infrastructure in which action can occur. Bartlett et 
al. (1995:230) and Victor et al. (1998:11) list several IGO functions within a regime; 
collecting resources and providing collective goods, coordinating behaviour according 
to set standards, help oversee and implement the commitments, manage the 
programmatic activities, and organize the meetings where decisions are made. By 
serving such functions IGOs can reduce the costs of negotiating commitments and 
coordinating behaviour, they can help elicit useful information and thereby help induce 
reciprocal behaviour through repeated interactions, which may make parties to 
agreements more willing to honour their commitments. By making nations and groups 
more aware of their “interests”, institutions can facilitate cooperation (or undermine 
it). Such general influences of organizations on behaviour and international 
cooperation operate in tandem with the particular regulatory and programmatic 
commitments at work in a particular area. Together with the transfer of resources, the 
GEF can serve as a facilitator or promoter of the regime, and contribute to enhance the 
effectiveness of the regime. I will return to a more detailed discussion of the terms 
above in chapter three. In the following I will give a brief presentation of the concept 
of effectiveness, as there are different theoretical approaches to effectiveness, and 
ways to make the concept measurable. 
 
1.2.1 The Dependent Variable 
As a point of departure the theory of environmental regime effectiveness assumes that 
the official purpose of international regimes is to coordinate behaviour in situations 
where the absence or failure of coordination will or can lead to sub optimal outcomes 
(Miles et al.2002:17). In this thesis, the empirical phenomenon under scrutiny is set to 
target such a sub optimal outcome, the incapacity of developing countries to 
implement the FCCC. I therefore find that the common sense understanding of regime 
effectiveness offered by Miles et al. (2002:4) to be more applicable, as they argue that 
   6 
a regime can be considered effective to the extent that it successfully performs a 
certain (set of) function(s). Such an approach to effectiveness directs attention to the 
specific responsibilities assigned to the financial mechanism, and the extent to which it 
has managed to achieve these tasks effectively. In order to be effective, the GEF must 
have managed to increase the capacity of developing countries to meet the objective 
and obligations of the convention. This will be measured by looking for change in the 
behaviour of actors through the shift of resources together with the extent to which the 
developing countries have been enabled to meet their obligations under the 
Convention. Miles et al. (ibid) nevertheless warns that this common sense approach to 
regime effectiveness is not sufficiently precise, I will therefore return to a more 
detailed discussion of definitions, criteria for evaluation and measurement in chapter 
three. 
 
Object of Analysis
I nevertheless find it necessary to make some initial comments on the measurement of 
regime operations. Miles et al. (2002:5) emphasizes the importance of being explicit 
about what is to be the exact unit of measurement. If it is the regime itself one wants to 
evaluate, meaning the impact of the decisions agreed upon within the framework of a 
regime, or if one wants to include potential positive side-effects, and costs connected 
with the operations of the regime (problem-solving efforts). I find the former approach 
to be the most interesting as it directs attention to the effects flowing from the 
activities of the regime in question. The second approach, focusing on the costs 
connected to the operations of the regime, would be useful if I was in a position to 
assess whether other scenarios could have led to more cost-effective processes. Such a 
comparison is for several reasons not feasible. The degree to which it will be possible 
to evaluate costs will be related to the consequences flowing from regime decisions, 
more precisely, whether or not the current setting has led to the expected outcome at 
the expected costs. This approach is in line with an evaluation of the regime itself, and 
will therefore be used as the unit for measurement.  
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This leads me to another related aspect, what regime phases to evaluate. Regime 
theory divides regime effectiveness into three separate phases; output, outcome and 
impact. Output should be understood as the political decisions taken within the 
framework of a regime, whereas outcome refers to the consequences flowing from 
those decisions as they are shown in actor behaviour. One could also evaluate the 
impact; improvements in the biophysical environment, but such an approach is beyond 
the scope of a financial mechanism. Studies of regime effectiveness, as used here, 
should include an evaluation of both output and outcome, because even though the 
regime decisions may seem effective on paper, they may turn out to be flawed in 
practice or actors can decide not to implement, and consequently the regimes 
contribution to effective solutions can be minor. I will clarify the meaning - and 
measurement of both output and outcome in chapter three, but I would like to stress 
that to determine the effectiveness of the GEF, most attention will be given to 
outcome, as this will evaluate the extent to which developing country implementation 
has been facilitated. 
 
1.2.2 The Independent Variables 
Many factors can affect the performance, and in turn, the effectiveness of a regime. 
Miles et al. (2002) claim that the following two categories of independent variables, 
problem-solving capacity and problem characteristics, are important determinants of 
effectiveness. I will only give a brief presentation of the two variables here, and return 
to the more detailed discussion of how they may affect regime effectiveness in the 
theoretical framework. 
 
Problem-Solving Capacity 
Problem-solving capacity can to some extent be said to be an institution’s ability to 
aggregate actor preferences. This capacity may be seen as a function of three 
determinants; the institutional setting of the organization; the distribution of 
power/capabilities among the actors; and the skill and energy invested in the political 
engineering of solving the problem. Institutional settings differ in terms of rules of 
access/participation, decision rules and level of and availability of financial resources. 
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The last two determinants, power and skill/energy differ by the extent that they have 
been utilized during the operations of the regime. The general argument, which will be 
emphasized in this study, is that some problems are solved more effectively than 
others because more powerful institutions or systems are set to deal with them or 
because they are attacked with greater skill or energy. 
 
Problem Characteristics 
Problem characteristics become an important determinant of effectiveness considering 
the kind of problem we are dealing with, does affect the solution chosen in the end. 
Environmental problems calling for collective-action problems are political issues, and 
as such they vary in their degree of malignancy. According to Miles et al. (2002:17) 
there are two main types of environmental problems; those which are caused by lack 
of coordination, and those which are caused by problems of incongruity. Most 
attention will be paid to problems characterized by incongruity because their degree of 
malignancy have a greater impact on effectiveness in the long run. To explain how 
malignancy affects the GEF, I will attempt to match problem-solving capacity with 
problem task and type.  
 
One can also approach problem malignancy by looking at scientific characteristics5. It 
is reasonable to expect that any interplay between science and politics will loom large 
the greater the scientific uncertainty, disagreement and/or complexity, and the more 
malign the problem. Since I am looking at a very small part of a regime, which is not 
focused on actually solving the problem, science will only be dealt with as it interacts 
with the political characteristics.   
 
1.3  Main Questions and Methodology 
1.3.1 The Questions to be Answered in this Study 
The aim of this thesis is to determine and explain the effectiveness of the GEF over 
time. I will mainly focus on the GEF beyond its pilot phase, the period from 1994 to 
                                                 
5 The science characteristics show how the problem is perceived by scientists and is determined by scientific 
uncertainty and the complexity of the problem. 
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2004.  To sharpen the focus of thesis, the approach of my research can be narrowed 
down to two research questions: 
 
How effective has the GEF been as the financial mechanism for developing 
country implementation of the FCCC? 
 
According to Miles et al. (2002:13) one usually assumes that the effectiveness of a 
regime tend to increase when it has had time to mature and penetrate the system of 
activities in question. Studies have shown that a regime’s effectiveness may vary 
considerably over time6 but in the case of GEF I expect this assumption to be more 
valid because effectiveness is likely to increase as the organization’s operations 
become more standardized. Which leads me to the second main question of this study: 
 
What factors have contributed to determine effectiveness, and in what way? 
 
The first question focuses on the dependent variable of this study, effectiveness and 
the extent to which the GEF has contributed to enable developing countries to 
implement the Convention. The second question, on the other hand, directs attention to 
the explanation of effectiveness, more specifically to the two independent variables, 
problem-solving capacity and problem characteristics. This approach and research 
questions will be backed by more narrow propositions and hypotheses based on the 
theoretical framework.  
  
1.3.2 The Methodological Approach 
This section will elaborate on the methodological approach of this study, and any 
concern of reliability and validity that may arise. 
 
The Single-Case Study Approach 
Qualitative analysis is aiming at a full understanding of specific phenomena, it is 
characterized by depth more than width, and the analysis is neither sharply separated 
                                                 
6 See for example Miles et al. (2002).  
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from the data collection nor based on standardized techniques of analysis. The case 
study is a part of the qualitative research tradition and Yin (1989:23) defines a case 
study as  
 
“An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident”. 
 
A case study approach is chosen for several reasons pertaining to the uniqueness of my 
empirical case, that the subject of this study is one phenomenon, and the opportunity to 
use many different sources of evidence. Data triangulation is one of the major strength 
of case study, and the need to use multiple sources of evidence far exceeds that in 
other research strategies, such as experiments and surveys and the like. The quality of 
a case study relies on a carefully and systematically developed research design, and a 
good case study should in particular meet the criteria of reliability and validity 
 
Reliability 
Reliability is determined by the extent to which a researcher demonstrates that the 
research techniques of a case can be replicated with the same results (Yin.1989:40). In 
the preparation and carrying out of a case-study, Yin (1989:79) stresses among other 
things: the development of a case-study protocol which is intended to guide the 
investigator in carrying out the case study, the use of multiple sources of evidence, the 
creation of a case-study database, and the maintenance of a chain of evidence from 
research question to the final conclusion.  
 
The assessments made in this study are based on a case-study protocol comprised of 
official and internal FCCC/GEF documents, independent evaluations, other scientific 
studies and articles, and several secondary sources. In addition, a number of interviews 
and presence at the meetings of the fall session of the GEF Council in 2003 are 
included. Even though I expect that a variety of sources to be one of the strengths of 
this study, there are some concerns in terms of reliability, which I will discuss below.  
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First of all, regarding secondary literature. The existing secondary literature about the 
GEF is rather limited, not surprisingly, as the GEF is a fairly young organization, The 
majority of the existing literature have focused on the GEF’s pilot phase and its 
restructuring negotiations, and not on its operations as of today.  However, if one 
perceives this literature as historical material, it is useful in terms of further 
investigation7. These sources are especially useful as background material for the 
second type of material that I use; official/internal GEF/FCCC documents and reports; 
independent evaluations; and scientific reports. Most of the data for assessing the 
effectiveness are found in these documents, and the majority of these are official GEF 
publications. Ideally, I should have several independent sources, and this criterion is 
only partially met through the limited availability of conducted GEF-evaluations. 
However, the GEF has been thoroughly evaluated by independent teams. Even though 
they have been GEF-funded, these external investigators have based their evaluations 
on in-country visits of the GEF target groups and reviewed GEF reports with much 
scrutiny, and as such will be perceived as being sufficient as independent sources for 
this study, especially when they are corroborated with the other sources that I have 
utilized. 
 
Another valuable source was the field trip I made to the GEF. In addition to the 
advantages of observing the decision-making process and other procedures of the 
Council, this field trip enabled me to perform interviews with representatives of GEF 
member countries, staff and NGOs. Prior to the Council Meeting I had only been in a 
position to conduct interviews with the Norwegian delegates to the GEF. Most of the 
interviews were performed as background interviews with the understanding that 
confidentiality would be preserved if so desired. These interviews were not rigidly 
structured, but open interviews with the dialogue flowing from some base questions 
made to suit the expertise and experience of the person interviewed8.  
 
                                                 
7 Yin (1989:92) claims that such sources can be especially helpful for the development of converging lines of inquiry.  
8 During interviews I made use of an tape recorder when feasible, and only aften being given permission by the respondents. 
Immediately after finishing an interview, I made a thorough transcribation of the contents of the tape, to provide an accurate 
rendition of my interviews. 
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Based on this case-study protocol I do consider the reliability of this thesis to be 
sufficiently high. Given the considerations made explicit above and the availability of 
the data utilized, it should be possible to replicate these data and techniques with 
approximately the same results. 
 
Validity 
I will only comment briefly on validity in this section, as I will get back to the more 
theoretically important considerations of validity in chapter three. A challenge 
confronted by every researcher studying regime effectiveness, is case selection – or 
internal and external validity.  According to Andresen and Wettestad (2001:3) internal 
validity involves making “within-case” causal relationships as plausible as possible, 
whereas external validity has to do with the boundaries between the populations of 
cases with which the findings can be validly generalized. Regarding the former, 
internal validity can be seen as a matter of selecting cases and variables and reducing 
the risk of biased results. To some extent high internal validity presupposes high 
reliability, since both the data gathering process and the operationalisation of the 
variables should be as replicable as possible. Concerning the latter, variables should be 
defined and operationalised so that the data relates to the theoretical constructs as 
accurately as possible (ibid). While I will return to the different variables in chapter 
three, it should be emphasized here that the operationalisation and measurement are 
based on a variety of sources. This provides me with multiple measures of the same 
phenomenon, and will add to the validity of this study. As to external validity, 
Andersen (1990:126) argues that it is possible to generalize from case studies. 
Generalization on the basis of a qualitative case study should, nevertheless, always be 
made with caution. Andersen (1997:20) argues that the typical case study is a lengthy 
narrative that follows no predictable structure and is hard to write and hard to read. In 
order to avoid such a pitfall a study should be built on a clear “conceptual framework”. 
The theoretical framework developed in chapter three is translated into explicit 
propositions and identification of both dependent and independent variables in an 
explanatory model intended to systematize data and bridge together the theoretical 
variables of the model. It can thus be argued that since the approach of the analysis is 
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theoretically derived, it should in principle, be valid for similar processes of 
international environmental regime implementation. I will return to any shortcomings 
of the theoretical framework in chapter three, I will, however, carefully warn that 
generalization is not a primary goal for this study, the single case study approach was, 
as already mentioned, chosen due to the uniqueness of my case.  
 
1.4 Outline  
The establishment of the GEF and its current institutional setting will be presented in 
the following chapter. Chapter three will elaborate further on the theoretical 
framework, and discuss the fruitfulness and limitations of the theory and empirical 
subject under scrutiny in this study.  
 
The effectiveness of the GEF in the field of climate change is the subject of chapter 
four. Effectiveness will be evaluated in terms of the operationalisation of the 
dependent variable in chapter three. This will be followed by an explanation of the 
degree of effectiveness in chapter five where I will focus on the independent variables. 
The results I arrive at in chapter four and five will be summarized in the last chapter of 
this thesis. 
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Chapter 2. The Case of GEF 
 
This chapter will give a brief account of the process that led to the establishment of the 
GEF, first as a pilot program, then later as a financial mechanism for global 
environmental conventions. 
 
2.1 The Establishment of the GEF  
While the need for increased funding for the environment was recognised already at 
the Stockholm Conference9 in 1972, it was in the Brundtland Report10 “Our Common 
Future” where the proposal to create an “international banking programme or facility” 
was first voiced. In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED) recommended that a mechanism should be established to finance investments 
in conservation projects and national strategies to enhance the resource base for 
development in developing countries (Gupta.1997:100). Recognising that earlier 
global environmental initiatives, including the UNEP, had suffered from lack of 
funding, the Brundtland Report registered the need for funding of sustainable 
development (Young.2002:50).   
 
The Brundtland Report credits Michael Sweatman as the source of its proposal for a 
multilateral fund (ibid). Sweatman, a banker and director of the International 
Wilderness Leadership Foundation (WILD), promoted the idea of a green financial 
instrument in the mid 1980s. Sweatman was initially interested in an international 
conservation bank to finance primarily investments in land, and to promote the private 
sector role in conservation worldwide.  
 
During the late 1980s, a growing number of international environmental problems 
received international, diplomatic, and organizational attention. Scientific and 
technical experts, agency managers, and NGOs generally agreed that developed and 
developing countries would have to work together to manage these “global commons” 
                                                 
9 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. 
10 In 1982 UNEP’s ten year review of the Stockholm Conference recommended the creation of a World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED). The Brundtland Report, Our Common Future, is one of this commission’s reports, 
published in 1987, named after the WCED’s leader, Gro Harlem Brundtland.  
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problems. They also agreed that most developing country governments had little 
information about, interest in, or capacity to act on these problems. Several IGOs and 
NGOs argued that developed countries should stimulate developing country 
participation by subsidizing capacity-building programs and environmental 
investments (Fairman.1996:58). As developed country environmental groups 
intensified demands for action on global environmental problems, and as work on 
several environmental treaties accelerated, developed country governments began to 
explore options for financing developing country action. 
 
The negotiations to create the GEF started in September 1989. It was the French 
finance ministry representative who made the request at a meeting of the Developing 
Committee11. France, supported by Germany, proposed to enhance the normal 
resources of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) by establishing an 
environmental envelope in the World Bank. Several other developed country 
representatives supported the request. France also promised to commit USD100 
million if other donors contributed enough to create a USD 1-1.5 billion fund 
(ibid:85). From the fall of 1989 through early 1990, the World Bank set into motion 
internal procedures to elaborate on the French proposal, and had bilateral soundings 
with France and other donor countries (Botnen.1997:27). World Bank management 
and staff drafted a proposal for a “global environment facility”, and this proposal was 
circulated to developed country governments in the spring of 1990 and to developing 
country governments in the summer of 1990.  
 
The World Bank proposed that the GEF address four global environmental problems. 
To help developing countries deal with these problems, the facility would support 
“programs and activities for which benefits would accrue to the world at large while 
the country undertaking the measures would bear the cost, and which would not 
otherwise be supported by existing development assistance or environment programs” 
(Fairman.1996:59). As soon as notional agreement had been established between the 
                                                 
11 The Developing Committee is the advisory and planning committee of the Board of Directors and Governors of the World 
Bank and IMF. 
   16 
27 participating countries, mostly donors and some selected recipient countries12, the 
GEF was established by a resolution of the executive directors of the World Bank in 
November 1990. The outcome of this negotiation is known as the GEF pilot phase. Or 
rather, the outcome of the negotiations continued to evolve over three years into what 
became the GEF pilot phase. Several issues were left undecided at the end of the 
negotiations, to be settled by the participants later (Botnen.1997:41).  
 
2.2 The GEF’s Pilot Phase 
The GEF was established as a pilot programme in the IBRD13 of the World Bank for a 
three-year period with the aim of providing new and concessional finance for the 
incremental costs of projects benefiting the global environment within four focal areas: 
climate change, biodiversity, international waters and protection of the ozone layer. 
The GEF aims to achieve global environmental benefits on global and focal issues 
based on the principal of cost-effectiveness (Gupta.1997:101). Cost-effectiveness 
defined as the amount of global benefit achieved per dollar spent (Fairman.1996:59). 
The GEF would support projects with significant innovation and demonstration 
potential. The facility would provide grants rather than loans, because the activities it 
funded would neither generate net financial nor economic benefits to the countries 
undertaking them (Gupta.1997:101). Grant money from the GEF would in effect 
compensate developing countries for undertaking activities, which were costly to them 
but generated benefits for the global environment. SDR14 850 million (or USD 1.5 
billion) were committed to the core fund (GET) of which the World Bank became 
Trustee, and in various co-financing agreements15.  
 
During its pilot phase, GEF was designed to have informal governance rules. 
Participation by interested developed and developing country states would be 
voluntary. Initially, both developed and developing countries were required to 
                                                 
12 Only a limited number of recipient countries were invited to join the GEF negotiations, based on geographical and regional 
importance; Brazil, China, Ivory Coast, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Marocco, Turkey and Zimbabwe.   
13 The IBRD is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the World Bank. 
14 The SDR or Special Drawing Rights form a part of the official currency reserves of the IMF member countries. In the GEF 
it is a currency used for the valuation of the SDR, or with the agreement of the Trustee in another freely convertible currency, 
and the Trustee may exchange the amounts received for such currencies as it may decide. 
15 28 countries contributed to the core fund, and the USA and Australia became participants by contributing via co-financing 
arrangements, increasing the number of participants to 30 from the outset (Botnen.44) 
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contribute at least SDR 4 million to become GEF participants. However, this 
requirement was waved after UNCED16. On the matter of eligibility for project 
funding, the GEF restricted it to countries with a GNP per capita of USD 4,000 or less, 
the same threshold used by the World Bank for its IBRD loans (Fairman.1996:85). 
There were no reporting obligations beyond those required for project proposals and 
no formal decision-making rules.  
 
Representatives of the GEF’s participating governments met twice a year at the 
Participants’ Meetings convened by the GEF’s Chairman. The chairman of the first 
Participants’ Meeting was Wilfried Thalwitz, the then World Bank’s Vice President 
for policy, research, and external affairs. Mohamed El-Ashry replaced him during the 
spring of 1991. El-Ashry became the second director of the World Bank’s 
Environment Department in 1990, and continued to chair the GEF and head the 
Environment Department throughout the pilot phase17.  At these meetings, participants 
reviewed and approved GEF’s work program by consensus to the ongoing conventions 
negotiations. Participants would not, however, review and approve individual projects. 
Final project approval decisions would be left to the managements of the three IAs 
(Fairman.1996:60).  
 
To administer the GEF’s the three IAs where chosen with separate responsibilities 
according to their presumed comparative advantages. The World Bank would serve as 
the GEF’s lead administrator, manage the GEF’s finances, and handle its investment 
projects. UNDP would handle technical assistance projects and coordinate GEF 
activities with national environment programs in recipient countries. UNEP would 
provide liaison between the GEF and the UNCED and convention processes; it would 
also organize and support an independent Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel 
(STAP). STAP would refine the GEF’s proposed overall strategy for each problem 
area, and would propose criteria for project selection18 (Fairman.1996:61). An 
                                                 
16 UNCED is the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio in 1992, also known as the Earth Summit. 
17 El-Ahsry resigned as GEF CEO in 2002, followed by Canadian Len Good. 
18 During the pilot phase, UNEP established, in consultation with UNDP and the World Bank, the STAP. The STAP is an 
advisory body to the facility providing objective scientific and technical advice on GEF policies, operational strategies, and 
programs, and conducts reviews of projects.  
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interagency implementation committee began the pilot phase with meetings almost 
every month and intensive interaction over project and program design, and became a 
forum for brief, formal reviews of each agency’s project proposals prior to submission 
to the Participants’ Meetings (ibid:65). There was a general agreement that NGOs 
could provide useful advice on project design and might be eligible for GEF funds for 
specific projects, however, in the pilot phase NGOs were not allowed to observe 
meetings of the GEF’s participating governments.  
 
The pilot phase, which ran from 1991-94, was meant to be experimental, providing 
lessons for the World Bank and the UN, possible new phases of GEF finance and/or 
for new institutions designed to work in the same field. It was also meant to bring 
together a new partnership of international actors for the global environment soothing 
North-South conflicts over liability for the costs of environmental action in the South 
(Young.2002:78). However, during the pilot phase, the GEF’s project portfolio was 
“frontloaded”: 60 per cent of its projects and 80 per cent of its funds were committed 
in the first half of its three-year operating life (Fairman.1996:86). This rapid 
development of the GEF-portfolio, was to ensure that the pilot programme was up and 
running before UNCED in 1992, where the Conventions, and GEF’s relationship to the 
Conventions, were up for negotiation. 
 
2.3 The Restructuring Process of the GEF 
Questions about reforming the GEF had already been raised during the first months of 
its existence. However, the process, which actually led to the restructuring of GEF, 
took place both during and after UNCED in 1992. In Rio, the two conventions up for 
adoption, one of them the Climate Change Convention, required restructuring of the 
GEF, in order for it to be accepted as their financial mechanism. Regarding the 
convention negotiations, the financial-mechanism issue was the most contentious in 
the negotiations, apart from targets and timetables (Bodansky.1995:3). Both the 
developed and the developing countries agreed in principle to restructure the GEF, and 
to make it the “interim” financial mechanism for the conventions. 
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The negotiations began in December 1992 in Abidjan, and were followed by seven 
more Participants’ Meetings in Geneva, Rome, Beijing, Washington DC, Paris, 
Cartagena and finally in Geneva again (Botnen.1997:8). Building on the UNCED 
mandate, agreement was quickly reached on the relationship between the GEF and the 
conventions, and on the main outline on the governance structure (Assembly, Council 
and Secretariat). However, the Participants’ Meeting failed to reach final agreement, 
and four issues were left unresolved. These were: who should preside of the Council 
meetings; which voting system to use; how many seats the developing countries 
should have in the Council; and how often the Participants’ Assembly should convene. 
The negotiations were supposed to be completed in Cartagena, but a final meeting had 
to be called in Geneva to allow the delegates time for consultations at home. Parallel to 
the restructuring negotiations, GEF donors discussed the replenishment of the GEF’s 
resources. At UNCED, donors had indicated that they would be willing to contribute 
up to USD 3 billion to a three-year GEF II. The replenishment discussions continued 
through the spring of 1994 (Fairman.1996:86).   
 
From the beginning it was agreed that the GEF should be based on existing 
institutions, however, with the acceptance of the need for an independent secretariat 
and since the GEF was to enter into contractual arrangements with the COPs to the 
Conventions, some sort of independent legal status would be preferable. In March 
1994 final agreement was reached on an “Instrument for the Establishment of the 
Restructured GEF”19, stating that the GEF was established as a separate legal entity, 
with its legal status deriving from its Participants’ Assembly, and not by another 
World Bank Board of Directors resolution, as was the legal basis for the pilot phase.  
 
 
                                                 
19  The Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured GEF is a legal document adopted by the governing bodies of the 
World Bank, UNDP and UNEP after participating governments signed an agreemeent to restructure the GEF in Geneva. As 
of 2004, 176 countries have joined the GEF. 
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2.4 The FCCC and the Restructured GEF 
The following figure represents the relationship between the GEF and The FCCC. The 
different FCCC/GEF forums will be the topic of the remainder of this chapter. 
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Figure 2.4 The FCCC and the GEF20
 
 
                                                 
20 All member states of the GEF have to assign a Focal Point as their GEF representative. Developing countries must also 
assign an Operational Focal Point to be responsible for the GEF-activities (projects) within the respective country. 
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The Conference of the Parties (COP) to the FCCC and GEF 
The COP to the FCCC meets annually to discuss and decide by consensus on guidance 
to give to its financial mechanism. These meetings are open for all countries that have 
signed the Convention. The responsibility sharing between the COP and the GEF is 
outlined in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the representatives to 
the COP and the GEF. The COP is to decide on policy, country eligibility criteria and 
funding. Whereas the GEF has responsibility for projects and programmes (GEF 
Secretariat.2003). The GEF Instrument also states that the GEF can spend its funds 
according to the purpose of the Convention (Hofseth.2003). 
 
The GEF Participants’ Assembly 
The Assembly is open for all GEF member states, including a representative of the 
NGO community, and decisions are taken by consensus. Each representative of a GEF 
participant can make a statement to the plenary meeting, but each oral statement 
cannot exceed four minutes and the list of speakers are prepared prior to the Assembly 
meetings. The Assembly meets once every three or four years to review the general 
policies and operations of the GEF, and make amendments to the Instrument if 
required, on the basis of reports submitted by the Council. According to the Rules of 
the Assembly, the Assembly is headed by the Bureau of the meeting, which is assisted 
by a Roundtable of Ministries, and other heads of delegations21. 
 
The GEF Council  
The GEF Council is the main governing body of the GEF, and it functions as an 
independent board of directors headed by the GEF CEO and an elected co-chair. The 
primary function of the Council is to ensure the effective operation of the GEF as a 
source of funding activities under the conventions22. It reviews and approves two work 
program annually, monitors and evaluates progress in the implementation of 
previously approved work programs. The Council also provides guidance to the 
                                                 
21 The Bureau consists of two Vice-Chairs, one representing a recipient country, the other a donor country elected by the 
Assembly. The Roundtable of Chairs reflect upon emerging points of consensus from the delegation statements and general 
debate and assists the Chair and Vice-chair in preparing the Chair’s summary (Rules of the Assembly). 
22 The Council has USD 300 million at disposal at each meeting for the support of GEF’s full-sized projects. The GEF also 
funds medium-sized projects (grants less than USD 1 million), enabling activities and projects under the small grants 
programme (up to USD 50,000). These projects are, however, not up for Council approval. 
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Secretariat, the IAs and other bodies, as well as the Trustee to mobilize financial 
resources.  
 
The 32 Council representatives meet semi-annually or as frequently as necessary at the 
seat of the Secretariat. The Council members represent constituency groupings; 16 
members are from developing countries, 14 members from developed countries and 
two members from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Federation of 
Russia23. Decisions are taken by consensus, and members representing 
multiconstituencies may cast separately the votes of each participant in the 
constituency. If no consensus appears attainable, any member of the Council may 
require a formal vote on substantial matters. Decisions requiring a formal vote by the 
Council are taken by a double weighted majority, that is, an affirmative vote 
representing both a 60 percent majority of the total number of participants and a 60 
percent majority of the total contributions.  
 
Since 1994, ten slots at GEF Council meetings have been reserved for NGOs 
(Regional NGO Focal Points). The following year it was decided to conduct 
consultations with NGOs the day prior to every Council meeting.  
 
The GEF Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the GEF Secretariat and IAs 
The CEO and Secretariat are located in the World Bank, and the staff of 40 includes 
members seconded from the Implementing Agencies as well as individuals hired 
competitively on an as needed basis by one of the IAs (consultants). The CEO heads 
the GEF Secretariat and organizes meetings of the Assembly and the Council. The 
CEO approves Project Preparation and Development Facility (PDF)24 block B and C 
grants, and determines the content of proposed work programs and endorses project 
                                                 
23 Three members, within each constituency, are granted access to the Council meeting. The 18 recipient constituencies are 
distributed among the following geographic regions: Africa 6, Asia and Pacific 6, Latin America and Caribbean 4, Central, 
Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union 2.  
24 PDF is a grant facility that grants money to the IAs for developing project concepts in three blocks: Block A (up to USD 
25,000 for pre-project activities at national level), Block B (up to USD 350.000 for obtaining information required to 
complete project proposals) and Block C (up to USD 1 million for completing technical design and feasibility studies for 
large-scale projects). 
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for final approval. The CEO also endorses on an annual basis two inter-sessional work 
programs, these are in addition to the two work programs approved by the Council25.  
 
The Secretariat implements the decisions of the Assembly and the Council. Together 
with the IAs, the Secretariat form the GEF Operations Committee that reviews and 
recommends projects for inclusion in proposed programmes to the CEO, including an 
indication of the financial resources required for the program up for approval by the 
Council. The IAs are also to promote measures to achieve global environmental 
benefits within the context of their regular work programs (mainstreaming), and to 
promote opportunities for mobilizing outside resources in support of GEF activities 
(co-financing).  
   
The GEF Trust Fund and Replenishments 
Together with the governance structure of the Council and Assembly, the core legal 
structure of the GEF is that of a trust fund. GEF is made up of three distinct funds; of 
which one is the core fund, the Global Environmental Trust Fund (GET). The GET is 
comprised of donor countries contributions and is used for GEF projects and 
administrative expenses26 (Botnen.1997:42). The World Bank is responsible for 
initiating and authorising the mobilization of resources, the replenishments of the Trust 
Fund. The replenishment in 1994 laid the basis for scenarios of a new “burden-sharing 
formula”27 starting from the historical level of contributions (Young.2002:133). The 
donor countries (primarily developed countries) agreed that a core replenishment of 
USD 2 billion should be built on ODA 10 shares. Since ODA10 basic shares of 
developed countries only add up to 87.81 percent, ODA10 basic shares were adjusted 
on a pro-rata basis to increase the shares of developed countries to 95 percent in order 
to avoid a funding gap. The remaining 5 percent is set aside for non-recipient donors 
(developed countries) not participating in the replenishment discussions as well as for 
                                                 
25 The inter-sessional work program is comprised of Medium Sized Projects and Enabling Activities (projects under the small 
grants program are administered by the UNDP). 
26 The other fund is comprised of funds available for associated co-financing on highly consessional or grant terms. The last 
fund is the Interim Multilateral Ozone Fund (IMOF) used for financial transfer under the Montreal Protocol of the Ozone 
Conventon. 
27 Burden-sharing is a term applied to the agreed sense of “fairness” in sharing the financial responsibiltiy of a multilateral 
effort. It is ment to provide the donors with a point of reference on budgetary practices that have evolved over time 
(GEF/R.3/7.Rev.1:2).  
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recipient donors (developing countries). The replenishments are closed, with access 
limited to countries pledging a minimum of SDR 4 million to the core fund. 
 
2.5 Summing up the FCCC and the GEF 
The purpose of this chapter was to give a presentation of the establishment of the GEF 
and its short-lived lifespan as a pilot fund, and its current role as a financial 
mechanism for environmental conventions. I would now like to briefly sum up some 
of the main characteristics of GEFs role within the climate-regime.  
 
While the GEF still is expected to function under and respond to the guidance of the 
Convention, it has also been given separate tasks and responsibilities. By having 
designated a financial mechanism, the regime has to some extent separated itself from 
the entity responsible for developing country implementation. Two main operations 
appear to be inherent in GEF’s role; the development of programmes and projects and 
ensuring a stable flow of resources available for project funding. While the GEF is not 
the entity that actually will implement these projects, it is accountable to the 
Convention for the outcome of the projects. It is therefore the GEF that carry the main 
responsibility for ensuring an effective implementation of projects in developing 
countries. Before one can evaluate the effectiveness of the GEF one has to determine 
what constitutes effectiveness. That is what I intend to do in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3. Theoretical Discussion and Analytical Framework 
 
The subject of this chapter is the theoretical tool that I will use in my evaluation and 
explanation of the effectiveness of the GEF. I will give an account of the concept of 
effectiveness, and how I will apply it to the GEF. I will also present the variables that 
determine effectiveness, and the relationship between them. But before I embark on 
the theory of regime effectiveness, I find it necessary to discuss some important terms. 
 
3.1 Definitions 
I briefly commented on the relationship between regimes and IGOs in chapter one, 
now I would like to clarify the distinction between regimes and IGOs for the purpose 
of implementation. In that regard, I find it necessary to first comment on the process of 
implementation. 
 
Implementation is a loose process that is not easily defined. Victor et al. (1998:4) use a 
common-sense definition of the implementation of international environmental 
commitments; “those events and activities that occur after the issuing of authoritative 
public policy directives, which include the effort to administer and the substantive 
impact on people and events”. In many instances, however, an implementation process 
appears to be never-ending; commitments are adopted; efforts are made to implement 
them; the commitments are adjusted. Problems are managed rather than eliminated and 
implementation becomes a part of a perpetual cycle of policy. Another characteristic 
of the implementation processes is that when national implementation is a demanding 
task, both the means and the outcomes of implementation are typically varied and 
uncertain.  Implementation for the purpose of FCCC is not only comprised of the 
myriad acts of governments, such as promulgating regulations and new laws, but also 
includes the activities of non-state actors, such as firms, scientists, consumers, 
environmental pressure groups, and trade associations, whose activities may or may 
not be stimulated by an international agreement. When many actors are involved, 
national implementation may become complex, as more political and economic 
interest is likely to be affected. In the case of the Climate Convention, two institutions 
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are designed to govern implementation. While Underdal (1998:69) claims that both 
regimes and IGOs can be seen as social institutions in a broader sense, there are 
defining features that distinguish them. 
 
Regarding the climate - regime and developing country - implementation, I find 
Krasner’s definition mentioned in chapter one (see section 1.2) to be too narrow for 
the purpose of this study. It has also often been criticized of being too vague28. Instead 
I find Bartlett et al.’s (1995:140) definition more fruitful, since they see regimes as the 
regulations developed within the context of a conference of parties (COP), which 
address both political and technical issues to the regime (governing a specific area of 
international relations). By focusing on the development of regulations this definition 
sees the Climate Change Convention as an evolving set of agreed upon principles, 
norms, rules, and created primarily through a series of international agreements. In 
contrast to Krasner’s definition, Bartlet’s approach to regimes does to some extent 
capture that regime implementation is an ongoing process based on an initial 
agreement that often is amended to incorporate subsequent experiences and decisions. 
 
What then, distinguishes the GEF from regimes in the process of regime 
implementation? Keohane and Haas (1996:5) define the GEF as a financial transfer 
institution for the environment; sets of rules, typically linked to one or more 
international organizations, established to govern a flow of funds from richer to poorer 
countries to achieve specific environmental purposes. The core feature that 
distinguishes the GEF from regimes in terms of implementation is that it is an IGO. 
Unlike regimes, IGOs, are physical entities founded by governments representing 
states, established to engage in problem-solving in the interests of, and possibly on 
behalf of, their member states. According to Young (1997:150) IGOs have certain 
advantages when it comes to serving regimes and their effectiveness. Unlike individual 
governments, they represent the broader regional and global community affected by 
                                                 
28 According to Levy et al. (1995:270) critics have attacked Krasner’s definition due to the difficulty of 
differentiating the four components of regimes. Principles are defined as “beliefs of fact, causation, and 
rectitude”; norms are “standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations”; rules are “specific 
prescriptions of action; and decision-making procedures are “prevailing practices for making and implementing 
collective choice”. 
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the activities being managed under the regime. As such they provide an institutional 
infrastructure within which activity and the various forms of governance can occur, by 
drawing participants from all affected countries. Underdal (1998:69) argues that it is 
only IGOs which may be said to possess legal personality or an organizational will and 
to whom, consequently, actions may be attributed. GEF’s potential as a promoter of 
international regimes is also based on its characteristic of being a financial 
organization. Young (1997:148) nevertheless warns that international organizations 
lacking a minimum of financial resources can easily be paralysed and fail. Ideally an 
organization should be able to, or at least to some extent, provide independent inputs 
into the problem-solving process or somehow amplify the outputs of this process. Lack 
of resources is, however, not just an internal problem; most league-of-states type 
intergovernmental organizations have only those revenues allocated to them by 
member governments. A common feature for the entire implementation process 
therefore appears to be that it is ultimately the governments that are the masters of the 
organizations, programmes and conference of the parties, and, as a consequence, 
making an international regime no stronger than the material capability of the 
participants that supports it (ibid).  
 
3.2 The Dependent Variable: Effectiveness 
There are several reasons why measuring effectiveness is not a straightforward 
operation. There are different ways of approaching the concept theoretically, together 
with the many methodological concerns that apply to the different approaches. In order 
to utilize effectiveness as a valid and reliable dependent variable, I need an approach 
and definition that is possible to measure and is theoretically derived. I will in the 
following give a brief presentation of the most common theoretical approaches, before 
I embark on the actual operationalisation and measurement of effectiveness.  
 
3.2.1 Evaluation Criteria 
One of the first challenges regarding regime effectiveness is how to understand the 
concept theoretically. As briefly mentioned in the introduction chapter, one has to be 
explicit about the exact object of measurement, this also applies to the theoretical 
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approach and evaluation criteria. Both Young (1999:4-5) and Levy et al. (1995:291-
292) list different approaches to regime effectiveness; the legal, the economic, the 
problem solving, the political and the policy-oriented approach. 
 
A common approach to regime effectiveness is based on a legal definition, and simply 
put; it evaluates a regimes success to the extent that conflicts become regulated by the 
rule of law and by the degree to which contractual obligations are met (Young.ibid). 
This approach does, however, ignore non-contractual consequences of regimes, and 
even more important, it overlooks that effective regimes in a legal sense, can be so 
without doing much to solve the problem that led to its establishment.  
 
This concern has implications for the second approach to evaluating a regime’s 
achievements, the economic approach. An economic definition of effectiveness would 
incorporate the legal definition mentioned above and add an efficiency criterion. 
Economists want to know not only if a regime generates the right outcome, but also 
whether it does so at the least cost. This approach is favoured by Keohane and Haas 
(1996:15), if one is to evaluate project effectiveness29. Such an approach could be 
valuable if I were to assess the effectiveness of the GEF by one or some of its projects.  
GEF-funded projects are implemented in very different settings and by different 
actors, which would raise concerns of both reliability and validity. Cost-effectiveness, 
on the other hand, is a guiding principle for the operations of the GEF, but I do 
recognize that whilst assessing a given institutional arrangement for solving or 
managing an international problem, one is seldom able to determine how efficient it is. 
To the extent that the economical aspect has been a factor affecting the operations of 
the GEF, it will be dealt with as a factor determining the effectiveness. 
 
Another approach to be mentioned is one that focuses on problem solving. 
Effectiveness is evaluated in relation to what degree the regime has solved the problem 
which spurred its establishment. Since the GEF is not established to solve the climate 
                                                 
29 Project effectiveness refers to how well, relative to costs, a single financial transfer or set of transfers contributes to solving 
particular environmental problem or set of problems, given the way in which problems are defined and pre-existing 
institutional arrangements (ibid). 
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change problem, I will not be in a position where I can measure the emission 
reductions required by all country members to solve the problem. 
 
Unlike the approaches above, the political approach directs attention to behaviour and 
behavioural change. This approach sees the problems regimes confront as a function of 
specific constellations of actors, interests and interactive relationships (Levy et 
al.ibid). Effectiveness is therefore a function of the degree to which the members of 
the regime alter their behaviour and interests as a result of the regime. The main focus 
of the evaluation of effectiveness in this study will be the behaviour of actors, more 
specifically the developing countries. The GEF will be considered effective if it has 
caused change in the behaviour of actors in a way that contributes to the management 
of targeted problems.  
 
Lastly, there is the policy-oriented definition of regime effectiveness. Levy et al. (ibid) 
claim that this is a useful approach when the regime explicitly sets out well-defined 
goals. Even though the regime under scrutiny here operates without an environmental 
goal or target, it specifies certain obligations, which the actors must meet as members 
of the regime. These obligations require actors to submit their national reports and 
communications to the regime, and the extent to which countries have met their 
obligations will be part of the assessment in this study, together with changes in actor 
behaviour.  
 
I will therefore utilize two criteria to evaluate effectiveness by: the policy-oriented 
approach, which I from now on will refer to as goal attainment30, and behavioural 
change. The effectiveness through both behavioural change and goal attainment cannot 
be evaluated without having assessed the former phase of regime effectiveness, output. 
The actual measurement of these two phases of regime effectiveness is the topic for 
the next section. 
 
                                                 
30 I found it necessary to refer to this criterion as goal attainment in order to avoid confusion regarding the 
measurement of the GEF at output stage. This will become clearer in the following pages. 
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3.2.2 Measurement 
This section will discuss how one can measure effectiveness. As previosly mentioned, 
I will focus on the two preceding stages of output and outcome. For international 
regimes having delegated responsibilities to an IGO, it does make sense to evaluate 
output in addition to outcome31. Both levels can, however, lead us to face conceptual 
as well as methodological challenges, hence I need to consider how to go about 
evaluating both output and outcome.  
 
3.2.2.1 Output  
Output is usually referred to as regime norms, rules and regulation, and there are 
several ways of measuring such an understanding of output. For instance, Miles et al. 
(2002:6) suggest focusing on the stringency of the rules32, and/or the level of 
collaboration established. I find neither criterion to be suitable for this study; 
stringency seems to be solely focused on the formal provisions of the FCCC and not 
on the activities delegated to the GEF as the entity implementing the regime. The latter 
criterion, on the other hand, seems to be of a more explanatory nature, and should 
rather be included in the analysis of problem-solving capacity. Instead, output can be 
approached by the extent the regime and its IGO proscribe or encourage “positive” 
behaviour that otherwise would not have occurred, or proscribe or discourage 
“negative” behaviour that otherwise would have occurred (Wettestad.2002:12). While 
it is clear that the GEF is to encourage implementation through the transfer of 
resources, the ways through which such transfers are to be made are not inherent in the 
Convention text.  Henceforth, GEF’s effectiveness is dependent on the development of 
programs that will proscribe appropriate developing country behaviour under the 
Convention. One yardstick is nevertheless not enough to assess output because one 
determinant can hide possible successes or failures. I will therefore add the criterion of 
inclusiveness. As point of departure, inclusiveness refers to the extent to which the 
system of activities is in fact brought under jurisdiction or domain (Miles et al.2002:6) 
According to Wettestad (2000:14) this means in practical terms, identifying the 
countries involved in the activities to be regulated and determining their share of the 
                                                 
31 In terms of regime stages, one stage of events serves as a starting point for the subsequent stages. 
32 The stringency with which rules regulate the behaviour of countries (ibid). 
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grand total of these activities. In the case of GEF, this refers to the development of a 
project portfolio. As a criterion for measuring effectiveness, the climate change 
portfolio refers not only to the type of projects that has been funded, but also the 
countries to which the transfer of resources has been directed. I am therefore left with 
two criterions for evaluating the output stage of GEF’s effectiveness within the 
climate-regime; the development of programs and the project portfolio, both of which 
I will explain in more detail below.  
 
Programs  
Under the convention, the options for how financial and technological transfer will be 
facilitated, must be developed into programmatic activities that the GEF will offer its 
target group, and as such will enable them to design projects and implement the 
convention. Wettestad (2000:12) suggests evaluating such programs in terms of the 
demands placed on the parties of the regime. This can be approached by asking 
through which policy options are financial/technological transfer to be facilitated, and 
how wide are the range of options.  Since the GEF can be perceived as a compensation 
for developing countries undertaking climate friendly-measures they otherwise would 
not have the capacity to undertake themselves, the programs should outline clearly the 
strategies and funding options available for GEF-support under the Convention. The 
development of programs therefore refers to the type of policy measures that are 
supposed to produce the effects that will meet the objective of the international 
agreement. This aspect of effectiveness will be evaluated in terms of the programs that 
will enable behavioural change and not behavioural change itself. 
 
The Project Portfolio 
As the target group of GEF projects under the FCCC is not a homogenous group, the 
GEF’s portfolio must reflect projects recognizing that the developing countries pose 
different levels of development, and hence are in need of different types of assistance 
and resource transfer. At the same time, the GEF acts as a financial mechanism for a 
global regime, meaning that all relevant actors are entitled to some of the resources. 
The GEF’s resource allocation as seen in its portfolio should therefore reflect a dual 
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funding strategy; while all countries should be enabled through financial assistance to 
meet their convention obligations, a larger share of the financial and technology 
transfer should be directed to the countries that pose the largest threat to the objective 
of stabilizing the ghg-emissions. The measurement of the project portfolio, as used 
here, essentially asks whether the parties to GEF include all states in whose domain 
the problem is located. All other things equal, long-term effectiveness will depend 
upon the inclusion of all relevant parties. 
 
In terms of evaluating effectiveness at the output stage, the project portfolio may be 
seen as consequences stemming from the programmes developed by the GEF. 
Assuming at least a rough match between the two dimensions of output would lead me 
to believe that effectiveness is increasing over time. A high score at a preceding stage 
is not sufficient and not even a necessary condition for high effectiveness at a 
subsequent stage, in terms of neither output nor outcome, the latter which will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
3.2.2.2 Outcome 
Assessing effectiveness on the basis of outcome is a matter of determining the effect of 
the regimes upon the behaviour of target groups. As already mentioned the aim of this 
thesis is to see if the GEF operating within the climate-regime has played an important 
“enabling role” with regard to countries not (yet) disposing the relevant technical, 
administrative and financial capacity. I will use goal attainment and actor behaviour to 
evaluate effectiveness. By using two evaluation criterions, I will be able to test the 
validity of the criterions, and the definitions will be regarded as sufficiently valid. The 
first criterion is rather easily measured as it entails looking at whether or not 
developing countries have managed to meet their obligations under the Convention; 
that is conducting and submitting their national communications. The latter criterion 
on the other hand needs some further consideration, as it entails measuring effects of 
capacity building.  
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According to Torvanger et al. (2001:66) the objective of capacity building in 
developing countries is to assist in building, developing, strengthening, enhancing and 
improving their capabilities to achieve the objective of the FCCC. Haas et al. (1993:8) 
see two key points where such effects of implementation can be seen; by contributing 
to more appropriate agendas reflecting the convergence and technical consensus about 
the nature of environmental threats; and by contributing to national policy responses 
which directly control sources of environmental degradation33. The former targets the 
issue of increased awareness and understanding of the problem, whereas the latter 
refer to policy development and/or reform. Both indicators are faced with 
methodological challenges.  
 
Many GEF-projects install and demonstrate equipment, and the directly installed 
capacity and energy savings from these projects can be significant, but these 
installations are fundamentally intended as demonstrations and must be replicated in 
order to achieve large-scale, indirect impacts. To date, only a small part of the GEF’s 
investment portfolio has been completed. The ‘final’ impact of the GEF is therefore 
yet to be established. A considerable part of the portfolio has, however, been in 
operation for more than two years, which will be sufficient in terms of drawing some 
preliminary conclusions on the possible success or failure of GEF’s efforts34. 
Recognizing that behavioural change is a rather ambitious approach in light of the low 
number of completed GEF-projects, I found it necessary to include both indicators in 
my assessment of the GEF. Increased awareness/understanding is what one may call a 
somewhat softer approach for measuring increased capacity compared to policy 
development. Legal frameworks and legislation established as a result of GEF projects 
are, on the other hand, considered important because they can foster the future of 
project operation well beyond the life of GEF funding. I therefore find it valuable to 
look at GEF efforts, so far, to facilitate policy development. There are, however, often 
other actors such as private entities at play in energy markets, and the measurement of 
                                                 
33 Haas et al. (ibid) also conceive of contributing to more comprehensive and specific international policies, agreed upon 
through a political process which core is intergovernmental policies, as evidence of effective implementation. However, in 
this case, that political process is the GEF and its policies, and these efforts are included in the output stage of effectiveness. 
34 By 2002, 30 climate change projects had been completed. 58 projects had been in the implementation stage for at least a 
year (Harstad and Ramankutty.2002:7). 
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this dimension of effectiveness should ideally include such stakeholders. But since 
government policies and decisions are assumed to have an impact on domestic actors, 
behavioural change will primarily target state behaviour in that sense 
 
To sum up, effectiveness at the outcome stage, will be measured by the extent to 
which GEF-funded projects have facilitated developing countries meeting their 
obligations under the Convention, and led to change in actor behaviour through 
capacity-building. 
 
An evaluation of effectiveness involves a comparison between the effectiveness 
observed, and some other standard. In essence this involves comparing the actual 
behaviour with the regime in operation with a hypothetical behaviour that would have 
occurred in its absence and/or the ideal pattern of behaviour assumed to lead to the 
collectively optimal solution, known as the Pareto frontier35. As neither the FCCC nor 
the GEF, state a clear goal, this makes it difficult to decide on an optimal technical 
solution. In addition, the roles of the convention parties and the GEF’s member states 
are differentiated, complicating any measurement of the different parties’ net benefit, 
and the collective optimum respectively. The former standard, on the other hand, is 
appropriate if we want to determine whether or to what extent the regime’s financial 
mechanism makes a difference. This point requires further explanation. How can one 
be sure that the observed changes are effects of the financial mechanism? One of the 
major obstacles for tracing any increase in developing countries’ capacity back to the 
GEF, is that many other actors are operating in the field. Wettestad (2000:15) suggests 
that one can assume invariance; that the situation that existed at the time when the 
regime was established would have remained constant over the time in question. The 
Convention explicitly states that without resource transfer, the developing country 
parties will not have the capacity to begin implementing the Convention. Thus one can 
assume, that without the GEF the pre-regime situation would remain status quo. This 
can, nonetheless, only be an assumption, as there is no way to control what would have 
                                                 
35 Miles et al. (2002:7-10) claim that the appropriate notion of the political optimum is the Pareto frontier. The Pareto frontier 
is reached when no further increase in benefits to one party can be obtained without leaving one or more prospective partners 
worse off. 
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happened in the absence of the financial mechanism. I will return to any implications 
flowing from such a baseline for which the effectiveness of the GEF is to be compared 
in chapter four. 
 
3.3 The Independent Variables 
Two independent variables are expected to contribute to determine the effectiveness of 
a regime, both of which will be discussed in this section. 
 
3.3.1 Problem-Solving Capacity 
The first independent variable is problem-solving capacity, meaning how much 
resources are being spent on solving the problem and how much energy and skill is 
being used. It is easy to understand that parts of the problem-solving capacity are 
dependent on problem characteristics; actors with no incentive to cooperate are not 
expected to invest great amounts of time or resources in solving the problem. 
However, organizations can have an independent effect on effectiveness through their 
capacity to manage problems. Problem-solving capacity, as used here, is made up of 
three determinants; the institutional setting, power, and skill and energy. 
 
3.3.1.1 The Institutional setting 
Miles et al. (2002:9) argue that what is political feasible depends on the institutional 
setting. Moreover, it depends on an institution’s capacity to remove initial constraints 
(by coupling or decoupling issues) and to integrate and aggregate actor interests and 
preferences. If institutions themselves have the opportunity to make binding decisions 
on behalf of its members, it should be seen as a strong institution. There are few 
international institutions with this kind of capacity, because it requires that states give 
up their sovereignty on specific issue arenas. In absence of such strong institutions 
there is according to Miles et al. (ibid) one particularly important factor that 
contributes to determine effectiveness; decision-making rules. However, decision-
making rules cannot be viewed separately from rules of access and participation. 
Hence, I will look further into the latter before I elaborate on how decision-making 
determines effectiveness. 
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Participation 
As point of departure a distinction should be made between rules of access and 
participation. Whereas the former refers to the rules regulating the possibility of 
participation, participation refers to the actual participation of various groups. 
Participation is therefore shaped both by such rules of access, as well as actor interests. 
In the following I will focus on rules of access, perceiving of institutions as a mean to 
regulate the access of actors to problems.  
 
Regimes can practice universal membership in which every state can sign up, or 
membership of a regime can be restricted to countries that satisfy certain criteria 
and/or pay a membership fee. Wettestad (1999:20) argues that in order to solve fully 
the environmental problems addressed, the participatory scope should match problem 
scope quite closely36. This is to some extent based on the expectation that the inclusion 
or involvement of stakeholders, notably target groups, will lead to better decisions that 
are implemented more thoroughly. Victor et al. (1998:22) claims that participation by 
such groups leads to effective agreements because of more realistic and higher-quality 
policies, and perhaps more importantly the development of a ‘target group stake’ in the 
process and outcome. According to Skjærseth (2000:32) target groups represent those 
actors who cause pollution and consequently those actors who are required to change 
their behaviour in order to fulfil commitments and domestic policy goals. In the case 
of GEF, the target group for the implementation of environmental activities is the 
developing countries. However, developed countries constitute an important group 
since they are expected to partly finance GEF activities. Consequently, both country 
groupings are necessary participants in the GEF.   
 
There appears to be less consensus on the inclusion of non-state actors. At one end, 
their inclusion is considered to enhance effectiveness. Young (1997:145) for instance, 
claims that such open systems permit greater public scrutiny by providing an 
opportunity for comments on government performance in implementing current 
                                                 
36 According to this reasoning the participatiory approach should be open to all participants if the environmental problem is 
perceived of as a global problem. Similarily, if a problem is viewed as smaller in scope, then rules of access should be 
narrower, for example, limited to states within a region. 
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commitments and on proposed changes in international environmental regimes. 
Skjærseth (2000:48), on the other hand, advocates against the inclusion of such actors, 
arguing that restrictive procedures for access of outsiders may stimulate both stability 
and mutual confidence. NGOs have been included in GEF processes, and following 
the different arguments presented above, their participation can work either way in 
terms of effectiveness. However, as a determinant of effectiveness, global participation 
is usually expected to decrease or hobble effectiveness. Wettestad (1999:21-22)  
therefore argues that a more flexible approach to participation is more favourable in 
terms of effectiveness. A flexible approach utilizes the strengths of both inclusive/open 
forums and more exclusive/closed forums. In the case of the GEF, this leads me to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
An institutional setting which practices different rules of access in different 
forums will lead to more effective regimes, than institutional settings that are 
solely based on universal/open participation.  
 
The advantage of this approach involves more that just participation, as will become 
apparent in the next section where I will discuss decision-making as a determinant of 
problem-solving capacity.  
 
 Decision rules 
The decision rule can make it either easier or more difficult to decide and influence 
how effectively states cooperate in implementation. Although decision rules are 
relevant to all kinds of problems, they gain particular importance when preferences 
diverge, as they do when problems are malign. A distinction is often made between 
unanimity - requiring the positive approval of all and the somewhat less demanding 
rule of consensus - requiring “only” the absence of any formal, substantive objections. 
Even though consensus is the decision rule most frequently used in international 
organizations, it can if practiced in combination with a requirement of open 
participation,  be the most demanding decision rule there is  (after unanimity). If all 
parties in a given group must join for a solution to be implemented, this gives each 
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party a veto, and collective action will be limited to those measures that are acceptable 
to the least enthusiastic party, which Miles et al. (20002:25) refer to as “the law of the 
least ambitious program”. A number of organizations have therefore some provisions 
for decision-making by formal voting, usually requiring a qualified majority on 
substantive matters. The use of majority voting tends to lead to more ambitious 
regulations. However, if this is accomplished at the cost of sacrificing the interests of 
significant actors, it will do so at the risk of impairing compliance. Under the 
Convention, the GEF faces the challenge of developing programs to guide its project 
activities and approving projects. Following the discussion above both tasks could be 
more effectively managed under a decision-rule requiring majority voting than under 
consensus or unamnity. But simultaneously this may come at the expense of actor 
interests. The previous section discussed the advantages of a flexible approach towards 
rules of access; much can be said in favour of such an approach to decision-making as 
well. Different forums are usually assigned different responsibilities, and by practicing 
different decision-making procedures to meet the problem task of the different forums, 
this can have a positive impact on effectiveness.  
 
Decision-making is nevertheless dependent on what Young (1997:148-149) calls the 
“default” that will continue in the absence of a decision. Thus, while assessing the 
impact of the decision-rule on effectiveness, one must also consider the non-decision 
option. In that regard, it is useful to look at other possible formal and informal rules of 
procedure that a regime/an organization may utilize, such as for example their 
differentiation into sub processes/committees, or the practice of developing draft 
proposals, so-called “negotiations texts”. Many institutional settings, particularly those 
that have been in active use over a prolonged time, develop their own informal codes 
of conduct or cultures (Miles et al.2002:25). When it comes to assessing the 
institutional setting’s impact on problem-solving capacity, I expect decision-making 
rules to be the most important determinant. A hypothesis regarding procedures of 
decision-making is given below. 
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Decision-rules providing qualified majority lead to higher levels of 
effectiveness than the decision rules of unanimity and consensus, as the delays 
in building such a broad consensus often hobble effectiveness.  
 
3.3.1.2 Power and Instrumental Leadership 
The remaining two determinants of an organizations problem-solving capacity, as used 
here, are power and instrumental leadership. I will take a closer look at the differences 
between these two determinants, before I discuss how they contribute to determine 
effectiveness. In international relations, power is seen as a something covering a range 
of eventualities from the force/coercion mode to the influence/authority mode. 
Leadership, on the other hand, may be defined as “the power of one or a few 
individuals to induce a group to adopt a particular line of policy (Andresen and 
Agrawala.2002:2; Malnes.1995:92). According to Malnes (1995:99) the concept of 
leadership should be reserved for influence which springs from other things than 
threats and offers. To understand this conceptualisation one must separate or 
distinguish between the mechanisms that powerful actors and instrumental leaders 
work, and the capabilities required to succeed. Influence based on threats and offers 
will here be referred to as power because it is only available to those actors with the 
capabilities to back it up. Such a strategy is not dependent on the consent of others to 
succeed, as it is the prospect of possible sanctions or rewards that are assumed to 
induce them to comply. Leadership on the other hand is, an (instrumental) leader 
induces people to do certain things by making them consent to underlying goals (ibid) 
Furthermore, he or she seeks to find means to achieve common goals, and convince 
others about the (substantive) merits of a particular diagnosis or solution framing 
(Andresen et Agrawala.2002:2). In the following sections I will look at how these 
determinants contribute to explain effectiveness. 
 
Power 
As point of departure, one can assume that the distribution of power or capabilities 
among the members of regimes is given, but this is not the same as saying that it is not 
worth studying. Usually one assumes that problem-solving capacity improves when 
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there are powerful actors in the regime, because an actor with great economic 
resources will be capable of punishing or rewarding other actors in the regime.  If, 
however, the most powerful actors in the regime are “laggards”, meaning those that 
have no incentives to cooperate, the effect of the power structure is likely to be the 
opposite of that above. Young (1991:306) expects power to loom large in settings 
featuring a highly asymmetrical distribution of power among participating actors, 
while Underdal (1994:182) claims that the responsiveness to powerful actors can be 
conceived of as a function of the characteristics of the followers themselves and of the 
problem they are faced with. The differentiation of the GEF member states into 
recipients and donors may have implications for the power structure and actor 
behaviour, but the extent to which this affect effectiveness is dependent on how actors 
utilise their positions and capabilities. This leads me to the following hypotheses on 
power as a determinant of problem-solving capacity and effectiveness:  
 
Concentrations of power in the hands of pushers tend to enhance effectiveness, 
whereas concentration of power in the hands of laggards usually has the 
opposite effect. 
 
Instrumental Leadership 
It is reasonable to say that unlike powerful actors, the skill and energy available for 
instrumental leadership have more to do with individual capacities than power and 
material capabilities Instrumental leadership usually stem from officials enjoying a 
position of authority or status. It should nevertheless be noted that positions of 
authority or status do not involve leadership by definition, it should rather be seen as a 
possible basis for leadership37 (Malnes.1995:98). In order to be able to influence 
others, a leader must offer resources in the form of competence, knowledge and/or 
skills, or possess personal qualities that will make others accept his or hers guidance. 
                                                 
37  According to Malnes (ibid:96) many people do as they are told by those who are authorised to direct their conduct, 
however, this does not qualify as instrumental leadership. Regarding status and positions, Underdal (1994:190) claims that 
special authority is conferred on the incumbents of certain formal roles, including those of Conference President, Committee 
Chair, and Secretary General. Underdal also refers to the actor’s position in the informal order, which is partly a matter of 
personal reputation, seniority, and so on, but it also depends on the political orientation. 
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Either because they have become convinced of the merits of a solution or because of a 
more or less diffuse faith in the leader’s ability to “find the way” (Underdal.1994:187).  
 
Instrumental leadership, then, involves efforts to change the constraints and 
opportunities for social interaction (Malnes.1995:91). If such efforts are invested in the 
operations of the regime, effectiveness will be enhanced by facilitating regime 
implementation, and the more skill and energy available, the more effective the regime 
will become. But even though potential sources for instrumental leaders can be 
identified, skill and energy is not always sufficient. While the need for instrumental 
leadership tends to increase with problem malignancy, supplying such leadership tends 
to become increasingly difficult as malignancy increases This leads me to the 
following hypotheses regarding instrumental leadership: 
  
If instrumental leadership is invested in the operations of the regime, 
effectiveness will be enhanced by facilitating regime implementation, and the 
more skill and energy available the more effective the regime will become. 
 
Regarding Power and Instrumental Leadership 
Before I begin discussing the second independent variable of environmental regime 
effectiveness, some final comments on the potential impact of power and instrumental 
leadership are in order. In terms of problem-solving capacity, I do expect that the more 
complex the problem and the more demanding the decision rule, the more critical 
power and/or instrumental leadership will become. Similar to Young (1991:303), I 
assume that the more resources are exercised, the greater the impact this will have on 
actor’s behaviour. I do, however, assume that powerful actors will be stronger than 
instrumental leadership in the sense that power as an instrument is expected to have a 
greater impact on the behaviour of others than skill, energy and knowledge.  
 
3.3.2 Problem Characteristics 
The second independent variable is problem characteristics. In this study I am 
primarily concerned with the political aspects of problems, the intellectual dimension 
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will only be considered if it interacts with political characteristics. At the political 
intellectual level some problems are substantively more intricate or complicated than 
others, implying that more intellectual capital and energy are needed to arrive at an 
accurate description or diagnosis and to develop good solutions. If such considerations 
apply to this specific case, they will be included. 
 
3.3.2.1 Political Problem Characteristics 
Environmental problems calling for collective-action problems are political issues, and 
as such they vary in their degree of malignancy.  According to Miles et al. (2002:17) 
there are two main types of environmental problems; those, which are caused by lack 
of coordination, and those, which are caused by problems of incongruity. Problems 
caused by lack of coordination are typically considered to be of a more benign 
character as the solution to such problem lies in the coordination of action. Most 
attention will therefore be paid to problems characterized by incongruity because such 
problems have a greater impact on effectiveness in the long run.  
 
Incongruity problems arise because there is asymmetry between individual and 
collective costs and benefits. What kind of positions the various actors possess in the 
asymmetric relationship will determine firstly, whether states choose to cooperate, and 
secondly whether they choose to implement the joint decisions.  If costs and benefits 
are highly asymmetrically distributed, conflicts tend to increase and this is likely to be 
reinforced if the problem or activity in question stem from point sources that are easy 
to identify (Skjærseth.2000:44).  
 
Many factors can be said to lead to incongruity problems, Victor et al. (1998:9) claim 
that three general aspects can be of significance, the ratio of costs to benefits; the 
distribution of those cost and benefits; and “strategic” considerations such as 
international economic competitiveness. Concerning costs, one usually approach 
environmental transboundary problems by abatement costs, but the costs associated 
with alleviating the climate change problem depend on a number of different factors; 
the expected costs of reducing ghg emissions, expected costs of future climate changes 
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in the country, the economic structure and trade patterns, energy system, energy 
efficiency, vulnerability, the extent to which measures have been implemented, to 
mention a few. In the case of the GEF and climate change, operating with terms such 
as global/national benefits, incremental/national costs and cost-effectiveness, I expect 
considerations regarding the costs of implementing projects to loom large amongst the 
actors involved, both donor and recipient countries. However, due to these terms, the 
expectations concerning actor behaviour in the case of GEF, differ from the 
assumptions often made regarding international environmental cooperation.   
 
Usually, one expects high-emitting countries to be more reluctant to cooperation since 
they could benefit more from a no-solution than low-emitting countries. Another 
assumption often made, is that the position of actors may be affected by the position of 
other actors. This is sometimes based on the expectation that it will be easier to get a 
country to stretch further if it expects other actors to do so as well, whereas one could 
also expect the opposite, that countries may consider the benefits of free riding when 
other countries implement measures to be large (Torvanger.2001.69). However, as 
discussed in section 3.2.2.1 (Output), high-emitting countries stand to receive more 
funding due to their higher level of emissions and would therefore benefit more from 
cooperation than low-emitting countries. In addition, the extent to which one can 
expect countries’ positions to be affected by the actions of other countries, seem more 
limited given that the GEF is designed to target countries’ lack of capacity to 
implement the convention. It seems more reasonable to expect that the level of 
resources available for climate activities will affect countries, at least in the short 
run38.  The question of how problem characteristic affect effectiveness in the case of 
GEF and climate cooperation is therefore more complicated than in the case of other 
processes of international cooperation. Thus, to explain how problem malignancy 
affects the effectiveness of the GEF, I find it necessary to look at how problem 
characteristics affect the given solution. This will by done by what Miles et al. 
                                                 
38 In the long run, however, countries may possibly be affected by increases in other countries’ capacity, and may consider 
that they could benefit from similar increases as well. But such long-term considerations seem to be the beyond the scope of 
the GEF’s ten-years life span. 
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(2002:15) refer to as matching problem-solving capacity with problem type and task39. 
By linking these two it will be possible to look at the institution’s characteristics and 
see how they affect the actors involved in the operations of the regime. More 
specifically, one can assess to what extent the institution has become an incentive for 
the actors to engage in the problem-solving efforts of the institution. According to 
Søfting (2000:11) the main incentive for a state to adopt policy measures, is that the 
international regulations or agreements they are based on must provide expectations to 
reap net benefit, or at least not lose. This is nevertheless also dependent on the extent 
to which actors agree on the given solution. 
 
If all actors favour the same goal, and all favour the same type of means to achieve the 
goals, we must expect effectiveness to be high. Such problems are problems of 
coordination, not of incongruity. If actors’ positions are incompatible, meaning that 
there are diverging interests when it comes to solutions, we must expect effectiveness 
to be low. A situation like that may occur if there are differences in how actors 
perceive the problem.  A problem may represent a conflict of interest, value or means 
to deal with it (Gupta.1997:32). This means that problem malignancy is affected by the 
extent to which actor interests are determined by the objective and subjective 
distribution of material consequences, the latter referring to the way actors have 
assigned subjective value or utility. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the 
more asymmetrical an incongruity problem, the more difficult it will be to find a 
solution that is acceptable to both or all parties (Miles et al.2002:19), and that a 
possible solution may require higher levels or perhaps more complex arrangements of 
cooperation (ibid:15). This leads me to the following hypothesis: 
 
The more political malign the problem the less effective the cooperative 
solution will be, since the conflict level tend to be higher than in the case of 
more benign problems. 
 
                                                 
39 Miles et al. (ibid) argue that what constitutes problem-solving capacity can only be determined with reference 
to a certain category of problems or tasks. 
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Having looked into the different variables of the theoretical framework, the remaining 
part of this thesis is devoted to an explanatory model. 
 
3.4 An Explanatory Model 
Given the many factors interacting in complex ways and difficulties of implementing 
environmental commitments, some might question whether is it possible to draw any 
systematic conclusions about the implementation process and ways to enhance 
implementation, and make definitive claims as to which factors are decisive in this 
particular case. To answer such concerns, I will in the following outline and discuss 
the explanatory model that is underlying the approach of this thesis.  
 
Figure 3.4 An Explanatory Model 
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The model is premised on the theoretical framework discussed in this chapter and the 
operationalisation of the various variables, and their mutual relationship.  Since the 
model centres on the effect of institutions, it is based on the assumption that processes 
of dealing with environmental problems takes place within the framework of 
institutions that to a varying degree are capable of tackling these challenges. A 
precondition for using this framework is, nevertheless, that problem characteristics are 
reflections of an incongruity problem, and this variable is assumed to become an 
increasingly important determinant of effectiveness the more malign the problem. The 
variable problem-solving capacity is therefore not truly independent since the 
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problems we are dealing with do affect the chosen solution. But it is assumed to be 
important in terms of effectiveness, for two reasons. Firstly, institutional arrangements 
can themselves have a significant impact on actors. Secondly, this variable points us 
toward factors that can be deliberately manipulated by decision-makers and hence be 
used as tools for problem solving (Miles et al.2002:3). An organization’s problem-
solving capacity can therefore play an important role to the extent which dilemmas are 
“resolved”, and hence the effectiveness of the process. As previously mentioned, the 
organization is by itself assumed to be a possible source for financial incentive for 
regime implementation, and as such can play an important role by altering the utility 
the actors assign to behavioural options within the given issue area. Following these 
assumptions, one can therefore expect countries to participate in regimes if they lower 
transactions costs, and if they have the problem-solving capacity with conditions for 
orderly negotiations. 
 
This approach may nevertheless face some limitations. Firstly, my characterization of 
the problem may be wrong and/or other relevant issues may determine actor 
behaviour, secondly, states are not rational actors. Skjærseth (2000:37) has questioned 
the use of the rational actor model40. Such an approach may be flawed because it 
solely seeks to explain the behaviour of states in terms of the context or circumstances 
in which they operate, rather than structures and processes internal to the parties (ibid). 
Such conditions may become especially important in this study since the GEF is set 
target a sub optimal outcome in environmental cooperation that has arisen due to the 
developing countries lack of capacity to implement the Convention. While it is 
reasonable to assume that developing countries will be affected by both GEF’s 
financial assistance and the context that governs the resource flow, other domestic 
conditions may affect their behaviour options. By overlooking such conditions, one 
may be at risk of ignoring important aspects that influence actor behaviour in 
international collaboration.  The propositions derived from the rational actor model 
will therefore not necessarily be verified. Although this approach assumes rational 
actors, the model will to some extent relax the proposition of rationality based on the 
                                                 
40 Skjærseth (ibid) claims that according to this model one can assume that actions of actors will be motivated by costs and 
benefits, and that actors will choose those options that are believed to maximize net gains. 
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logic of consequences to meet the shortcomings mentioned above. The model is 
relaxed in the following ways.  
 
Actor behaviour is not only explained by the context of international environmental 
cooperation. Structures and processes internal to the different actors can affect actor 
willingness and ability to engage in international environmental cooperation. Lack of 
ability is assumed to be of more importance, since actors without sufficient ability to 
engage in problem-solving efforts, are not likely to see their utility change as a 
consequence of institutional arrangements. Actors’ willingness, on the other hand, is a 
different matter. Actors can have the ability to cooperate, but lack the willingness. 
Within such a context, actors do behave in line with the propositions flowing from the 
rational actor model. There is, however, another option. Actors may be able, but do not 
necessarily know what they want when they participate in international environmental 
cooperation. They enter into a process of discovering, inventing and exploring both 
own interests and possible solutions. In such scenarios one can expect that actor 
behaviour can be explained within the context they operate, unless they learn through 
the process that cooperation do impede on their domestic conditions and /or 
constraints.  
 
Following these modifications, there may be three reasons why states do not 
implement joint decisions: their problem-generated preferences are of a kind that 
implementation will not pay off even when given the opportunity for financial 
assistance, that lack of problem-solving capacity is so great that implementation is not 
possible or because actors’ lack of ability (or possibly willingness) prevent them from 
entering into environmental cooperation. 
 
The purpose of this chapter and the above model was to present the theoretical basis 
for this study, and the analytical approach. Having discussed both the dependent 
variable and the independent variables, I will in the subsequent chapters evaluate the 
effectiveness of the GEF and analyse the determinants explaining effectiveness.  
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Chapter 4. The Evaluation of the Effectiveness 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the effectiveness of the GEF as the financial 
mechanism for the FCCC. This will be done in accordance with the theoretical 
considerations in the previous chapter. This chapter has two main parts; part one will 
focus on the output stage of regime effectiveness, whereas part two will target the 
outcomes of the operations of the financial mechanism. Lastly, I will attempt to trace 
the observed behaviour back to the regime in question. 
 
4.1 Output 
Following the theoretical framework this section will attempt to answer to which 
degree the GEF has been effective in developing programmatic activities that will 
enable developing countries to implement the FCCC; and the extent to which the GEF 
has facilitated the implementation of developing country activities as seen in its 
climate change project portfolio.  
  
4.1.1 Programs  
As the financial mechanism for the Climate Change Convention, the GEF had to 
develop programmatic activities based on the Convention text, which merely states 
that developed country implementation is to be facilitated through the transfer of 
financial and technology resources. Two years after having been assigned the role as a 
financial mechanism the GEF’s Operational Strategy for its climate operations was in 
place41. The Operational Strategy for climate change outlines various approaches to 
enabling activities and migitation/adaption through technology transfer42. This latter 
category has been divided into four long-term operational programs for different 
climate change activities. The Operational Programs (OPS) are intended to provide 
conceptual and planning framework for the design, implementation and coordination 
of a set of projects to achieve global environmental objectives (Porter et al.1998:74).  
                                                 
41 The first draft is dated October 1996, and the final printed version appeared in June 1997 (Porter et al.1998:74). 
42 Enabling activities are intented to facilitate implementation of effective response measures, including amongst other 
national communications (FCCC Article 12.1). Mitigation measures reduce or lead to the reduction of ghg emissions from 
anthropogenic sources or protect or enhance removal of such gases by sinks (thus reducing the risk of climate change),  
whereas adaption activites minimize the adverse affects of climate change.   
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The Enabling Activity Program  
This program aims at supporting developing countries in fulfilling their commitment 
under the FCCC, and includes ghg inventories, compilation of information, policy 
analysis, and strategy and action plans. These activities also seek to increase the 
capacity of developing counties by providing basic information to enable policy and 
strategic decisions to be made, or assist planning that identifies priority activities 
within a country. 
 
OPS 5 - Removal of Barriers to Energy Efficiency and Energy Conservation 
This program seeks to remove barriers to large-scale application, implementation, and 
dissemination of least-economic cost, energy-efficient technologies. Projects under 
this program intend to target the many costs associated with transaction for 
identifying, procuring, installing, operating and maintaining energy-efficient 
equipment (Martinot and McDoom.2000:4). 
 
OPS 6 - Promoting the Adoption of Renewable Energy by Removing Barriers and 
              Reducing Implementation Costs  
OPS6 targets both the removal of barriers to commercial and near-commercial 
renewable technologies; and reducing any additional implementation costs for 
renewable energy technology that results from practical experience, initially low-
markets or scattered applications, so that economically profitable ‘win-win’ 
transactions and activities will increase the deployment of energy technologies (ibid). 
 
OPS 7- Reducing the Long-Term Costs of Low GHGs Emitting Energy Technologies 
Projects under the OPS7 aim to reduce ghg emissions from anthropogenic sources by 
increasing the market share of low ghg-emitting technologies that have not yet become 
widespread, and least-cost alternatives in developing countries for specified 
applications. 
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OPS 11- Promoting Environmentally Sustainable Transport 
The last GEF-program supports long-term shift towards low-emissions forms of 
transport. OPS11 was not launched before 1999, and since the change faciliated by  
projects under this program is not readily available at the time of my assessment, this 
Operational Program will not be included in this study. 
 
The goals of the first two programs are similar; they only differ in that they address 
different technologies that often face different key barriers (Martinot and 
McDoom.2000:6). The goal of OPS 7 is cost reduction; reducing the long term costs to 
commercially competitive markets. The OPS 7 is based on the assumption that when 
technology costs decline sufficiently, technologies will be adopted and replicated by 
the private sector43. 
 
Through these four wide strategies the GEF has outlined a framework for project 
development, which makes knowledge of climate-friendly technologies available for 
developing countries that might otherwise lack such knowledge. These frameworks 
provide the developing countries with various options for altering their ordinary 
energy- and/or development-programs and policies to include environmental concerns. 
The GEF’s strategy and programs, devising ways in which developing countries can 
begin meeting the objective of the Convention, have therefore reduced the demands 
placed on the developing countries in the case of Convention-implementation. Based 
on the Operational Strategy and Operational programs for climate change-activities, 
the GEF has paved the way for programmatic activities that will enable developing 
countries to initiate projects in line with the Convention’s objective and obligations. 
The extent to which  the GEF has funded projects in accordance with these programs 
will be dealt with in the following section. 
 
                                                 
43 For many technologies in this program, the “buy-down” process will take many years, the GEF’s goal is to 
accelerate this process (ibid). 
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4.1.2 Project Portfolio 
Following the theoretical propositions in chapter three, this indicator will assess the 
degree to which GEF has managed to bring its’ activities within its’ jurisdiction. The 
following figure is an overview of the various projects that have been funded by the 
GEF since 1991. 
 
Figure 4.1 The Climate Change Portfolio 1991-2002 
 
GEF’s Climate 
Change programs  
Short 
term 
measures
Enabling 
Activities 
OP 5 OP 644 OP 7 OP 11 
Number of projects 25 142 40 52 10 3 
GEF Allocation USD 137.25 82.45 250.69 394.64 200.29 1,080.5
Total Project Cost 628.31 88.61 1727.18 3,948.26 584.08 7,101.9
 
Since its inception, the GEF has financed 272 climate change projects at a cost of 
1,080.55 USD million (GEF-allocations)45. The portfolio has directed 10 percent of its 
funds to short-term measures46 and 90 percent to long-term measures. According to 
Christoffersen et al. (2002:23) long-term programmatic approaches try to coordinate 
all GEF-funded projects within a country with a long-term national strategy. So far, 
such coordination has only taken place in China.  
 
Under the Convention the GEF has funded the full costs of 142 projects targeting 
enabling activities at a cost of USD 82.45 million. Regarding the investment portfolio 
in which the GEF funds the incremental costs of the various projects, the majority of 
the projects implemented has been under two programs; the removal of barriers to 
energy efficiency and energy conservation  (OPS5) and promoting the adoption of 
                                                 
44 OPS 6 emphasize only a few technologies, primarily home systems for off-grid solar energy applications. 
45 The majority of these projects are country-specific projects, but some projects target several countries simoultanously as 
they are regional or global projects. 
46 Short term measures are response measures in the form of high priority projects which are in neither of the other 
categories, but yields climate change benefits at low costs (FCCC/SBI/2002/14:4). 
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renewable energy by removing barriers and reducing implementation costs (OPS6) 
Based on the different programs presented in the previous section, the GEF portfolio is 
balanced between investment projects and non-investment projects.   
 
Following the theoretical propositions regarding GEF’s project portfolio, GEF’s 
funding of projects should reflect a somewhat dual strategy when it comes to financing 
climate-measures in developing countries. It should target capacity building in all its 
member-countries, simultaneously as it provides a larger share of funds to the 
countries which are large emitters of ghgs. Under the enabling activity-program, 132 
developing countries have so far received resources covering the full costs of projects 
that focus on meeting their obligations under the Convention. Under the financing of 
countries’ reporting-requirements, vulnerability and adaption to climate change 
impacts are emerging as important areas (Christoffersen et al.2002:21). Considering 
that the number of member countries of the GEF has been steadily increasing since its 
inception, and is now currently counting 176 member states (of which about 30 states 
are developed countries not eligible for funding), I find that the GEF has been 
effective as a financial mechanism for the Convention.  
 
The financing of investment projects has been equally in line with the theoretical 
propositions. The top ten ghg-emitting countries among those eligible for GEF projects 
have received 87 percent of the total funding47 (Porter et al.1998:101). These countries 
account for nearly one-third of all emissions of carbon from fossil fuel burning 
worldwide48. The projects that were financed in these countries initially focused on 
technology development and demonstration, whereas more recent projects have 
targeted market development, demonstration of sustainable business models, financing 
mechanisms, or demand-side initiatives (Christoffersen et al.2002:15).  
 
                                                 
47 The GEF has based its allocations by relating potential benefits to historical emissions levels as the effects of providing 
larger benefits scores to largers emitters (GEF/C.23/7.2004:14). 
48 These top ten ghg-emitters are China, Brazil, Mexico, India, The Federation of Russia, Morocco, Philippines, Ecuador, 
Colombia, Argentina. The twentyseven other countries which  received the remaining 13 percent of the country-based 
funding account for only a tiny percentage of the world’s carbon emissions from fossil fuel burning  
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In terms of including the member states in the operations of the regime the GEF 
appear to have performed effectively. It has managed to differentiate among different 
activities relevant for different actors, and has as such met the requirement of both 
financial and technology transfer to the developing countries.  
 
Summing up Output  
Summing up GEF’s effectiveness at the output level, one can perceive the dimension 
of program development as a the subsequent developments of a regime once it has 
been agreed upon, whereas the dimension regarding the project portfolio as measures 
taken in response to the programmatic approaches. In section 3.2.1 I made the 
assumption that one could expect effectiveness to be increasing if there was a match 
been the two output levels. To some extent this is confirmed when I have evaluated the 
two dimension of output but no clear-cut picture stands forth until I have assessed 
outcome. This is what I intend to do in the next section. 
 
4.2  Outcome  
Following the theoretical propositions, outcome effectiveness will be assessed 
according to the following two criteria; goal attainment and behavioural change. The 
first criterion, goal attainment, is a matter of developing countries meeting their 
reporting obligations under the Convention. The latter will evaluate behavioural 
change based on increased capacity as seen through awareness raising and policy 
development in developing countries.  
 
4.2.1 Goal Attainment  
The ability of countries to meet the overall objective to the Convention relies on an 
accurate knowledge of emissions trends and reliable ghg inventories49, countries 
reporting efforts are therefore an important part of the Convention. Concerning 
developing countries and convention obligations, the FCCC states that:  
 
                                                 
49 These inventories cover emissions of CO2, Ch4 and N2O, and to the extent HFCs, PFCs and SFGs. 
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As member of the Convention, each developing country was expected to submit its 
initial communication within three years of the entry into force of the Convention for 
that party, or depending on the availability of financial resources50.  
 
As seen under section 4.1.1, a substantial portion of the funds from the GEF has been 
directed to help developing countries to develop adequate national monitoring, data-
collection and recording systems. Initially it did not seem like the GEF had been very 
effective in achieving the Convention-requirements of preparing national 
communications and reports in developing countries. Evaluations of the GEF has 
found that the reports were slow in emerging, and even the Convention Secretariat was 
under the impression that many countries would not be able to complete their reports, 
even after receiving funding for preparing them (Christoffersen et al.2002:15; Porter et 
al.1998:56). By the end of 1997 only seven developing countries had submitted their 
national communications; Argentina, Uruguay, Senegal, Mexico, Micronesia and 
Zimbabwe, all of which have received GEF grants for enabling activities (Porter et 
al.ibid).  Three years later the number of those who had completed their national 
communications had only risen to 25 developing countries (Amous et al.2000:3; 
GEF/C.17/8.2001:31). In terms of the time frame given by the Convention for 
developing countries reporting obligations, few developing countries appeared to have 
met their convention obligations. 
 
There has, however, since then been a sharp increase in the submission of developing 
countries’ reports to the Convention. By 2002, 79 developing countries have formally 
submitted their national communications to the UNFCCC of the 132 countries that by 
2002 had received financial support and technical guidance 
(FCCC/CP/2002/4.2002:9). In addition, a few developing countries have submitted 
their second national communication report; China, Uruguay, Mexico and Republic of 
Korea.  
 
Even though many developing countries have met the requirements of the Convention 
through the financial and technical assistance offered by the GEF, the FCCC has found 
                                                 
50 Except for the least developing countries which do so at their convenience. 
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the quality of the reports of varying degree.  Some documents have been considered 
impressive (producing both national and environmental benefits), but others only 
passed as satisfactory (FCCC/SBI/2002/14:10). It has also been pointed out that many 
developing countries have not completed their analysis of vulnerability and only a few 
have identified policy options for adaption. But as mentioned under section 4.1.1, 
these areas did not receive much focus until recent years.  Despite the varying quality 
of the final reports, evaluations have found that the process of preparing these reports 
has helped build capacity, especially the scientific and technical knowledge in 
countries and the development of new methodologies for addressing climate change 
have been significantly enhanced (Amous et al. 2000:12-13; FCCC/SBI/2002/14:14). 
This lead me to believe that the GEF has played an important role in increasing the 
capacity of developing countries to meet their obligations under the Convention. 
 
The effectiveness of the GEF to enable developing countries to undertake their 
reporting requirements to the Convention appeared initially to be low, but due to the 
increase in the number of developing countries that since then have conducted and 
submitted their national communications, the GEF is given a high score on 
effectiveness. Effectiveness at outcome stage is, nevertheless, also to be measured by 
behavioural stage. 
 
4.2.2 Behavioural change 
This section will evaluate effectiveness based on the extent to which the parties to the 
regime have altered their behaviour because of the regime. Following the theoretical 
framework, behavioural change as seen by increased capacity will be measured by 
looking at GEF’s contributions to raising awareness and understanding of the climate 
change problem, and policy development in developing countries. I will not be able to 
go into details concerning the behavioural change of all the actors within the regime. 
This decision  is to some extent given by the project- and country-evaluations, as they 
have been reviewed by independent evaluations. Although the majority of GEF-funded 
projects have been evaluated, the countries that have received a larger share of 
resources have also been the primary targets for such evaluations. Since these 
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countries have undertaken more projects than countries that have received 
considerably less funding, the GEF’s approach to case-selection does make some 
sense, but as a methodological criterion for country-selection it is not sufficiently 
valid. I will therefore search for possible patterns flowing from the implementation of 
GEF projects. These patterns will be divided into moderate to significant change, and 
little to moderate change in developing countries. 
 
4.2.2.1 Increased Awareness and Understanding of the Problem 
Capacity building is a central feature of most GEF projects51, and this section will look 
at the extent to which these projects have raised awareness of the climate change 
problem and understanding of the different technologies that will enable them to 
manage the problem in the long run.  
 
Moderate to Significant Change 
GEF-financed projects did not generate visible results until 1998, when Porter et al. 
(1998:93) found that GEF’s efforts had contributed to raising awareness in a few 
countries, among them Brazil, China, India and Mexico. GEF contributions to bring 
climate change to the attention of people were nevertheless small outside a relatively 
small circle of people involved with GEF projects, and evaluations have found that it 
was mainly limited to scientific communities (Porter et al.1998:25; Christoffersen et 
al.2002:20). While these initial and rather moderate findings were a consequence of 
GEF-assistance to countries’ reporting requirements mentioned in previous sections, 
subsequent developments in these countries do indicate that GEF-projects have 
generated more significant results.  
 
According to Christoffersen et al (2002:62), GEF-projects have had the effect of 
broadening country processes by bringing global environmental issues to the attention 
of national policymakers and by informing public opinion. This increased awareness in 
the form of more understanding of the climate change problem has in some cases led 
                                                 
51 Enabling activities provide support for planning and endogenous capacity building including institutional strengthening, 
training, research, and education intended to facilitate implementation of effective response measures in accordance with the 
FCCC (Harstad and Ramankutty.2002:5). Capacity building related to technology transfer is intended to help developing 
countries to understand, absorb and diffusing technologies (Martinot and McDoom.2000:4). 
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to the creation of institutions or strengthening of existing institutions. This enables 
countries to assess climate change challenges from a national perspective, determine 
the most promising opportunities for project development, and subsequently pursue 
full-scale projects (ibid.2002:20). Heggelund et al. (2005:8) have for instance found 
that GEF projects have improved both environmental conditions and domestic 
institutional capacity in China. However, in terms of countries’ appreciation of the 
importance of the climate change issue, GEFs contributions may have fallen a bit 
short. While GEF efforts have brought global environmental problems to the attention 
of developing country representatives, local and regional environmental issues 
continue to be given higher priority than global problems such as the climate change 
problem52.  
 
There nevertheless appears to be a greater awareness and knowledge of specific 
technologies among policy-makers, financial institutions, firms, utilities, investors, 
energy sector companies, investors, and NGOs as a result of GEF commitments of 
funds (Harstad and Ramankutty.2002:19). Increased understanding of the technologies 
has generated results in that both completed and ongoing projects have fostered growth 
of domestic industries for energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies and 
services, increased sales and investments, provision of environmentally sound energy 
services and have in some cases fostered institutional strengthening and creations for 
technical diffusion. For example projects targeting the application of technologies to 
reduce atmospheric methane emissions from coalmines and to recover these emissions 
for use as a fuel have led to the recovery of coal-bed methane becoming a national 
priority in China. Evaluations have found that prior to GEF-financed projects, methane 
was perceived as a nuisance, with only a small amount used for domestic and limited 
industrial purposes53 (Martinont and McDoom.2000:12; Christoffersen et al.2002:16). 
In Brazil, the GEF contributed to facilitate technology development through the 
adaption of gasifier/gas turbine systems to burn biomass fuels, along with associated 
                                                 
52 Heggelund et al. (2005) recently conduced an evaluation of the effectiveness of  GEF achievements in China, the largest 
recipient country of GEF funds, and found that Chinese representatives do consider local/regional problems to be more 
important. 
53 The rate of recovery of methane from the coal-bed has also increased from 40 to 70 percent (ibid). 
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techniques for collecting and handling such fuels (Christoffersen et al.2002:15). Due 
to several project targeting different sides to this technology, the technology has been 
brought to the threshold of commercialisation. India has similarly experienced an 
increase in private power wind farms and in the number of manufacturers. In Mexico, 
the government’s redesigned rural development’s program reflects a switch from grid-
connected rural electrification to solar- and wind-powered homes (Harstad and 
Ramankutty:2002:14). 
 
Even though some projects in these countries have been less successful in generating 
results, the findings above do lead me to believe that the GEF’s achievements in these 
countries are considerable. The GEF has stimulated both national awareness and 
understanding of different technologies that has enhanced their capacity to manage the 
climate change problem. These findings correspond with the GEF’s funding strategy  
(see section 4.1.2). It is within the countries to which a larger share of GEF resources 
has been directed, that the first effects of GEF-projects have emerged. There are 
several other countries that have been targeted by the GEF, and the extent to which the 
GEF has facilitated change in these countries is discussed in the following. 
 
Little to Moderate Change 
I found it necessary to divide behavioural change into two parts because apart from the 
GEF’s achievements in the countries mentioned above, its contributions appear to have 
facilitated considerably less change in other countries. While GEF-financed activities 
have generated increased national capacity, the overall pattern is that the increase in 
countries’ awareness is partly a result of developing country representatives’ 
involvement with the preparation of national communications. Through those activities 
they have been enabled to better appreciate and cope with the challenges of climate 
change issues, but as mentioned in section 4.2.1, it has mainly contributed by 
enhancing the scientific and technical knowledge and to developing new 
methodologies (Amous et al.2001:64).  These activities have not helped countries to 
prepare strategies to deal with climate change (ibid.3). There has also been raised 
some concern over the sustainability of these efforts. Sustainability essentially raises 
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the question of whether or not the project beneficiaries will maintain their increased 
understanding and continue to work on enhancing their newly acquired capacity after 
project completion and ceased GEF-funding. While this may be an accurate 
description of GEF-activities in some countries, GEF’s contributions appear to be 
sustainable in other cases. Christoffersen et al. (2002:20) has found that newly trained 
professionals have formed informal networks among different regions and countries, 
which has increased the participation by developing country representatives in the 
international climate debate. Thus, it does appear that the GEF has contributed to 
raising the profile of the climate change in some countries. 
 
Even though these countries have received considerable less funding than the higher 
emitting countries covered in the previous section, the GEF has financed activities to 
increase their knowledge and understanding of different technologies. The GEF’s 
contributions appear, however, to be moderate, sometimes small. The GEF has 
especially encountered difficulties in promoting grid-connected renewable energy 
(Christoffersen et al.2002: 23). Projects in Ghana, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and 
Zimbabwe achieved little success. Harstad and Ramankutty (2002:12) have also found 
that energy-efficiency projects in Chile, Peru and Tunisia illustrate that GEF efforts 
have not always managed to generate results. While this is not an all-inclusive list over 
GEF-financed climate-projects, they do indicate that there are the different patterns 
flowing from GEF-financed activities. Regarding this group of countries it appears that 
the GEF has not managed to considerably increase their capacity as measured by 
awareness and understanding.  
 
Common to GEF-financed projects in both country groupings as outlined above are 
nevertheless that project outcomes are slow in emerging. This can be partly explained 
by the novelty of the financial mechanism and that no clear-cut picture stands forth 
until GEF’s climate change-portfolio matures. Christoffersen et al. (2002:21) and  
Harstad and Ramankutty (2002.13-14) have, however, found that in general the 
acquisition of technological know-how is more difficult than originally expected. It 
should be noted that GEF-activities often serve as demonstrations, and that replication 
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of such demonstrations is considered integral to the GEF’s climate change strategy54. 
Replication of some GEF projects is underway, but there are some concerns regarding 
the prospects of effective replication of GEF-projects. Christoffersen et al. (2002:22-
24) have found that the process of widespread replication has been slow, and have in 
some cases run into difficulties. There has been cases where replications of projects 
have begun even though the projects has not been completed, these do, as of today, 
appear to be exceptions rather than a general pattern flowing from GEF’s efforts.  
 
4.2.2.2 Policy Development  
The effectiveness of the GEF is also to be evaluated on its contributions to policy 
development or reform. Given the varying outcomes of GEF’s efforts to raise the 
profile of the climate change problem as seen in the previous section, one may not 
expect the GEF to have fostered much change in policy. Most evaluations have also 
concluded that policy reform has been modest, but there is one exception, and I will 
look into this before I embark on looking at the general pattern flowing from GEF’s 
strategies for policy or regulatory framework development. 
 
Through the GEF, China, the largest country in terms of recipient of GEF funds and 
emissions of ghgs, is developing new energy programs and approaches that go beyond 
one-time, stand alone projects. As previously mentioned, projects have generated 
viable results in terms of both increased awareness of the climate change problem and 
understanding of different technologies, and the recovery of coal-bed methane has 
been included in it’s environmental and energy policies. In addition to these 
accomplishments, GEF and China agreed in 2002 on the development of long-term 
programmatic approaches to energy efficiency and renewable energy (Harstad and 
Ramankutty.2002:14). GEFs contributions have therefore led to substantial policy 
development, but as of today such development is mainly limited to China.  
 
Christoffersen et al. (2002:23) have concluded that in general climate change concerns 
appear to have not been integrated into national development policies or in regulatory 
                                                 
54 Replication may occur from local to national markets, from one private firm to others, from one local government to 
another, and from one country to another. 
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or legal development. GEF has developed several strategies for policy development, in 
which the government of developing countries are called upon to support sustainable 
energy systems on a political level by providing necessary frameworks, from a 
country’s general investment climate to the legal conditions for access to the central 
grid to the existence of technical standards, import tariffs and zoning regulations55 
(Miller and Martinot.2001:3). So far it appears that the GEF contributions to policy 
mainly involve setting up national codes and standards and developing specialized 
regulations (Christoffersen et al.2002:21).  
 
Codes and standards are important elements of reducing commercial risks and 
purchase risks and making markets sustainable (Martinot and McDoom.2000:51). 
Such strategies have been targeted by the GEF in three fields; appliance standards, 
product labelling and consumer information in relation to energy efficient product 
manufacturing and markets (lights, boilers, refrigerators, chillers); energy-efficient 
codes and standards for buildings; and solar powered home lightning equipment codes 
and standards. The two former strategies appear to have generated viable results. 
Harstad and Ramankutty (2002:11) have, for instance, found that a GEF-financed 
project in China developed and helped enact new national refrigerator standards, 
influencing manufacturers and consequently the market for efficient refrigerators. 
Other countries in Asia are launching projects to emulate the Chinese experience. Due 
to GEF-financed activities, energy-efficient codes and standards for buildings have 
also been developed in the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Thailand, and Tunisia.  
 
Regarding GEFs projects financing solar powered home lightning systems, most 
projects contain some support for equipment codes and standards (Miller and 
Martinot.2001:4). Although technical standards are improving and codes have been 
enacted in Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, it appears to be few projects that have 
                                                 
55 The development of regulatory and legal frameworks can encourage project developers, typically from the private sector to 
finance and install renewable energy generation sources and sell power to an electric utility or directly to consumers. 
Regulations governing independent power purchasing agreements and/or power purchase tariffs can all remove barriers. The 
establishment of codes of practice, industry standards, and equipment certification procedures can also encourage more 
private sector initiatives  (Martinot.2001:3). 
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led to much observable change in rural energy policies (Christoffersen et al.2002:23; 
Harstad and Ramankutty.2002:12-13). 
   
Utility demand-side management regulatory frameworks have also been developed 
with the intention of providing financial and other incentives for utilities to actively 
finance and promote energy efficiency improvement. Christoffersen et al. (2002:24) 
have found that countries of Brazil, China, Costa Rica, India, Jamaica, Mauritius, 
Mexico, and Tunisia have supported means for improvements in energy efficiency. 
Either by for example setting up policy frameworks featuring smart incentives, 
through investment plans intended to encourage private sector investments or by 
removing non-financial barriers. In Malawi, the government has integrated micro 
credit and community banking approaches into its energy and sustainable development 
plan (Harstad and Ramankutty.2002:14). With exception of the latter example, it 
appears that so far the GEF has achieved the most in the field of efficient lightning.    
 
The last strategy that have been launched by the GEF has been to assist regulators and 
utility managers in establishing power-purchase tariffs and model power-purchase 
agreements (Miller and Martinot.2001:4). Such frameworks can be important by 
encouraging installation of grid-connected wind, biomass, hydropower and geothermal 
generating technologies. According to Harstad and Ramankutty (2002:3) this has only 
been accomplished in Mauritius and Sri Lanka so far. While notable projects are 
currently taking place in other countries (among them Cape Verde, China, India, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Philippines), the effectiveness of these agreements has varied. It 
appears to be successful in Mauritius, but in Sri Lanka the framework has resulted in a 
compromise power purchase framework that appears to not be sustainable (ibid:13).   
 
Following these findings, the GEF has only had modest success in facilitating policy 
development. Apart from its considerable achievements in China, the GEF has 
contributed significantly less in the other countries in which strategies have been 
launched. But even though the immediate effect of GEF-financed activities may not 
have been the establishment of newly created policy frameworks, many projects 
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appear to have encouraged government support and facilitated some adjustments in 
policy.  This can possibly lay the basis for policy developments in the future, but as of 
today it is not sufficient in order to give the GEF a high score on effectiveness. 
 
Summing up Outcome 
The previous sections have attempted to assess GEF’s contributions to enabling 
developing countries to meet their obligations under the Convention, and the extent to 
which the parties to the regime have altered their behaviour because of the regime. 
This study has found that the GEF has been effective in assisting countries to prepare 
and submit their national communications to the FCCC. The GEF’s contributions to 
raising awareness and increasing their knowledge of technologies do, however, appear 
to vary across the group of developing countries. The GEF’s contributions do to some 
extent reflect the facility’s funding strategy, but GEF’s varying achievements in 
developing countries may also be a consequence of the different types of projects that 
it supports. Providing assistance to reporting efforts is a somewhat less demanding 
task than demonstrating how to stimulate both market and political conditions for 
improvements in energy efficiency and renewable energy. It is therefore reasonable to 
expect effectiveness to be higher in the former case, than in the latter.  It does, 
nevertheless, appear to be the case, that the acquisitions of technology know-how and 
policy development/reform have been difficult, in some countries more than others. 
The effectiveness of the GEF is therefore found to vary, both according to the different 
tasks under the convention, and depending upon project type and country. 
 
4.3 Assuming Invariance 
An evaluation of effectiveness involves a comparison between the effectiveness 
observed, and some other standard. Wettestad (2000:15) suggests that one can assume 
invariance; that the situation that existed at the time when the regime was established 
would have remained constant over the time in question. In terms of goal attainment, 
the number of submitted reports without GEF-assistance is a strong indication of the 
critical role that GEF has played in enabling countries to meet their convention 
obligations. In 2002, a total of 83 developing countries had completed and submited 
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their reports, and only four of these countries prepared their reports without GEF-
funding (FCCC/CP/2002/4.2002:9). Invariance therefore appears to be a good baseline 
for comparing GEF’s contributions to enabling countries to meet their obligations 
under the Convention. 
 
Assuming invariance is, however, an insufficient approach for comparing GEF’s 
contributions to behavioural change. One of the major obstacles for tracing any 
increase in developing countries’ capacity back to the GEF, is that there are many 
other actors and forces operating in the field. One way to go about this task is to 
compare the contributions of the GEF with other actors, but such a comparison is 
difficult considering the GEF’s unique mandate and organizational design. Some 
comments can nevertheless be made. While Clémencon (200:1) rightfully claims that 
the resources made available by the international community for such measures in 
developing countries are small compared to estimated needs, both the UN and the 
World Bank has funded measures in the developing world along side the GEF. While 
the UN agencies have as mentioned in chapter two often suffered from lack of 
funding, the UN system has also been recognized as being a very ineffective system 
(Young.2002:96). The World Bank and similar Bretton Woods-institutions have, on 
the other hand, been considered to be rather effective, at least when compared to the 
UN (ibid:22). Considering GEF’s short life span and it’s achievements at the time of 
my evaluation, the GEF appears to be more effective in generating results than the UN. 
In terms of it’s contributions vis-à-vis the World Bank efforts, making any claims 
regarding its effectiveness is more difficult, and should probably be left for others to 
make. 
 
Another way to embark on tracing the observed behavioural change back to the GEF is 
to try to separate the contributions of the GEF from other actors and forces in the field. 
Regarding the latter, changing circumstances in markets independent of the GEF, and 
even changes in governments are important factors that at times have had an impact on 
project execution. Sometimes GEF-activities have been beneficiaries of such changes, 
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while other times projects have suffered56. Concerning other actors in the field, efforts 
supporting sustainable development in developing countries have been launched prior 
to the establishment of the GEF and alongside GEF’s efforts. At the same time, many 
developing countries have undertaken their own renewable energy programs57 
(Martinot et al.2002:314). While one could probably claim that the GEF has benefited 
from earlier efforts, it is not an indication of how effective the GEF has been in 
facilitating change in developing countries. In that regard, I find that one has to look 
into the experiences of people involved in GEF projects, and their considerations of 
GEF’s contributions. Project stakeholders in the countries of Brazil, China, India and 
Mexico have expressed that GEF support generated increased environmental 
awareness, not least through its various training programs (Harstad and 
Ramankutty.2002:11; Heggelund et al .2005:8). Chinese government representatives 
have also expressed that GEF projects have been important in influencing policy 
(Harstad and Ramankutty:2002:14). None of the yardssticks above provides us with a 
sufficient standard for comparing effectiveness, the important point to be made is 
nevertheless that due to several GEF projects, energy efficiency procedures have been 
initiated and a process set in motion, and some countries are in a better position to deal 
with these problems than they would have been without GEF support and funding. 
 
4.4 Summing up Effectiveness 
This chapter attempted to assess the effectiveness of the GEF in terms of different 
regimes stages and according to different criteria. Effectiveness was found to vary 
according to the different tasks of the financial mechanism, and across the goup of 
developing countries. The GEF appears to have performed well at output stage, but the 
findings regarding the outcomes of GEF’s operations are more elusive. One could 
argue that there is a missmatch between the different stages, but I find it difficult to 
                                                 
56 As an illustration, the GEF project supporting wind power in India occurred in parallel with explosive market growth 
during the mid-1990s (Miller and Martinot.2001:2). While the GEF project contributed to strengthen the capabilities of the 
India Renewable Energy Development Agency and helped to raise awareness of the viability of wind power technology, 
market conditions was at same time favourable. Hence, both the GEF-financed project and internal conditions in India 
independent of GEF-activities, contributed to increased interest for financing of wind farms. In contrast, two other GEF-
projects did not benefit from changing market and political conditions. The implementation of the Indonesia Solar Home 
Systems ran into difficulties due the country’s macroeconomic crisis. A project in China has been delayed by many years, 
because of changes in local government (Harstad and Ramankutty.2002:13-14). 
57 For example many countries have been adopting measures to incorporate the results of the Rio process and Agenda 21 into 
national plans, policies and programs. In addition, bilateral and multilateral agencies are supporting many of these efforts. 
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make any claims in that regard considering the low number of completed projects in 
the GEF’s portfolio. I did attempt to evaluate effectiveness over time and despite the 
reservations made concerning an evaluation based on the portfolio, a prevailing pattern 
of GEF-activities is that results are slow in emerging and that its performance appear 
to have been mixed. Why this is so is the question to be answered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5. Analysis of the Determinants of Effectiveness  
 
This chapter will attempt to explain the results I arrived at in the previous chapter. 
Following the theoretical framework of regime effectiveness, there are two 
independent variables that contribute to determine effectiveness; problem-solving 
capacity and political problem characteristics. I will look into the former first, before I 
explain how problem malignancy affect effectiveness by matching problem - solving 
capacity with problem type and task.  
 
5.1 Problem-Solving Capacity 
The first independent variable that contributes to determine the effectiveness of the 
financial mechanism is problem-solving capacity. To see how GEF’s problem-solving 
capacity determines effectiveness, I will look at three determinants; the institutional 
setting; power; and instrumental leadership.  
 
5.1.1 The Institutional Setting 
With the exception of the setting for replenishing the GEF Trust Fund, the GEF-
forums face the challenge of policy-making and project-approval. This section will 
look at how the institutional setting contributes to determine effectiveness. The 
decision-rule together with rules of access can make it either easier or more difficult to 
implement the convention. Following the theoretical propositions in chapter three, a 
flexible approach to both determinants is assumed to have a positive impact on 
effectiveness. The governance system outlined in the GEF Instrument fits the 
theoretical description by combining both open, inclusive forums (the COP and the 
Assembly) with more closed forums (the Replenishments and the Council). I will look 
at the former forums first. 
 
5.1.1.1 The Open Consensus Based Forums  
The COP and the GEF 
In chapter three, I defined regimes in terms of implementation as evolving sets of rules 
and regulations. While one can expect subsequent amendments and adjustments in 
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policy to enhance effectiveness, it is also reasonable to expect that they can become an 
obstacle. Young (2002:122) has found that this was a concern of the former GEF CEO. 
Initially, he warned that the COP-guidance to the financial mechanism had the 
prospects of seriously hinder the ability of the GEF to assist recipient countries, by 
increasing the number of priorities to such an extent that the idea of priority activities 
is severely diluted (ibid). The main obstacle related to the guidance of the COPs has, 
however, not been its annual provisions, but the COP’s lack of ability to make 
decisions on what guidance it is to provide to its financial mechanism. When a 
problem is characterized by a high degree of malignancy, policy-making by the 
decision-rule of consensus becomes extremely difficult. Discussions at the COPs are 
of a highly political nature, including debates on broad issues related to changes 
needed in North-South relationships (Christoffersen et al.2002:48). The guidance 
produced by these meetings has therefore become inexplicit by political necessity 
under the decision rule of consensus, in order to satisfy all the decision-making parties. 
The GEF has, nevertheless, managed to move ahead, instead of having to wait for 
clarifications from the COP that probably would never have come. Because of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the GEF has been able to develop programs 
and approve and fund projects without interference by the COP to the FCCC. The 
MoU states that the COP is to look at policy, eligibility criteria and funding, whereas 
the GEF is to look at projects and programmes. The extent to which COP guidance can 
be seen to have been incorporated in the GEF’s portfolio, it can be seen in the short-
term (10 percent of the portfolio) and long-term (90 percent) strategy for climate-
measures (Porter et al.1998:53). 
 
The Assembly 
Since 1994, two Assembly Meetings have been held, mainly resulting in two 
Assembly Declarations58. Discussions at the Assembly are of a similar character as 
discussions in the COP; highly political covering broader issues of a Northern-
Southern character. As described in chapter two, the consensus-based Assembly has 
several procedures intended to facilitate an effective duration of its meetings, but this 
                                                 
58 The New Delhi Declaration and the Beijing Declaration. 
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has not had a decisive impact on its discussions. The operations of the Assembly has, 
however, not had a decisive impact on the effectiveness of the GEF since the 
Assembly has been somewhat marginalized as a decision-making body within the 
setting of the GEF. Despite the different roles and responsibilities assigned to the 
different GEF forums by the Instrument, most decisions are in practice made by the 
Council. All items presented for the Assembly have been passed through the Council 
and are as such brought to the agenda of the Assembly with the advice of the Council. 
For example, even though the Assembly officially is to decide on programmes, the 
Council decides on “the content” of each programme up for Assembly approval59 
(Observation. 2003).  Thus, the prevailing role of the Assembly is to legitimise the 
GEF through global participation by providing member-countries (mainly developing 
countries) that do not frequently sit on the Council, the occasion to participate directly 
and to review the general operations of the GEF. 
 
5.1.1.2 The Closed Forums 
The following sections will look into the two remaining GEF forums which both are of 
a more exclusive nature. I will first explain how the decision-making procedures and 
rules of access of the Council contribute to explain the effectiveness of the GEF, 
before I look at any effects the Replenishments may have had on GEF’s operations. 
 
The Council 
Decision-making Procedures 
The operations of the Council have become more business-like, in that at least at face 
value, North-South tensions have decreased. Country representatives to the Council 
conceive these meetings to address matters of substantive technical, developmental 
and financial character (Christoffersen et al.2002:48; Young.2002:156). This is in 
stark contrast to the political approach seen in the sections regarding the COP and the 
Assembly. The differences in countries’ approach in the GEF forums, are a 
consequence of the different procedures of the Council. Although the representatives 
of the Council are to make decisions by consensus, the possibility of a formal vote 
                                                 
59 Several interviewees made this point, but the example is from my observation of the GEF Council meeting, where the GEF 
Secretariat explained the procedures for approval of GEF policies to the GEF representatives. 
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being called giving weighted voting power according to countries’ funding, means that 
the power of the Council in practice is skewed in favor of the developed countries. 
Chapter four found that the Council has managed to agree on the GEF’s Operational 
Strategy and Operational Programs. The lack of consensus is nevertheless prevailing in 
that the Council has not managed to develop a consistent approval procedure for the 
projects that it funds, even after having been in operation for nearly ten years.  
  
Porter et al. (1998:69) have found the incremental cost criterion, the task of separating 
the costs that are to be met by GEF resources and the costs that are to be covered by 
the developing countries, has been the major obstacle to the process of standardizing 
the approval procedure of GEF-projects. Despite several efforts by the GEF Secretariat 
to demonstrate and operationalise this principle, an understanding that would be 
acceptable to all countries has not emerged60. Consequently, the Council has had to 
practice a flexible interpretation of this principle. The approval of projects and release 
of GEF funds (under the strategy and different programs) according to this principle is 
pragmatic, agreed on a case by case-basis (Hofseth.2002; Porter et al.1998:69; 
Young.2002:150).  Given the decisions-making procedures available to the Council, 
one might have expected that the issue of the incremental costs would have been 
resolved by the formal vote option. But despite the lack of consensus, the formal vote 
has yet to be called by any Council member. To understand the impact of decision-
making rules, one must look at the implications of the default option for the different 
actors in the regime. 
 
The Default Option - Formal Voting  
From a developing country perspective it is relatively understandable why this 
procedure is not an option. Developing countries do not stand to gain from formal 
voting, since it gives the developed countries a veto. But this reasoning does not 
explain why the developed countries have not called the formal vote. The developing 
                                                 
60 The following documents represent the GEF efforts to develop and demonstrate this concept; Incremental Cost Policy 
Paper (GEF/C.7/inf.5), Report on Incremental Costs (GEF./C.14/5), Note on Incremental Costs (GEF/C.13/7), Progress on 
Incremental Costs (GEF/C.12/Inf.4), Program for Measuring Incremental Costs for the Environment (PRINCE), Standard 
Reporting Format for Incremental Cost, Streamlined Procedures on Incremental Cost Assessment, Paradigm Case 
Illustrations of Incremental Cost Analysis.   
(www.gefweb.org/Operational_Policies/Eligibility_Criteria/Incremental_Costs/incremental_costs.html) 
   71
countries have tried to avoid this option for several reasons; firstly, because, they do 
not want to be seen as if they are making judgments on the behavior or internal affairs 
of the developing countries (Hofseth.2003). Secondly, even though formal voting 
would pass the criterion through the Council, it may risk compliance and would 
therefore not have much effect. Lastly, the formal vote would distinguish between the 
developed countries weighted votes; both according to their pledged contributions, and 
the contributions actually made. It would therefore have implication for the power-
relationship, not only between the developed and developing countries, but also within 
the group of developed countries.  
 
In light of these constraints, other procedures have been utilized. In the case of project 
approval and especially developed country objection to a project, project approval has 
either been postponed, or it has been approved simultaneously as arrangements have 
been made for the Trustee/Secretariat to halt the transfer of funds. Even though the 
process for reaching consensus on GEF’ programs appear to have been less 
conflictual, the Council has had to rely on other procedures in order to pass these wide 
programs through the Council. A common procedure has been to postpone decision-
making by arranging for a technical group to look closer on the matter, and then return 
to the issue at subsequent meetings with the report and comments of the technical 
group (Hofseth.2003). In other instances, the Council has agreed to take a note of the 
document/issue and thereby avoiding decision-making altogether 
(Observation.2003)61.  
 
While these efforts have contributed to a more efficient duration of the Council-
meetings, these procedures have not always managed to overcome some of the 
shortcomings of the pragmatic approach. To understand why this pragmatic procedure 
is important in terms of explaining effectiveness, one must look at the implications it 
has had for the development of GEF projects. The flexible interpretation of the 
                                                 
61 The US has been reluctant towards approving both the GEF Corporate Budget and the GEF Business Plan. The Business 
Plan is usually reviewed and approved by the Council at its Fall meeting, and sets the stage for review and approval of the 
annual GEF Corporate Budget presented to the Council at the following Spring meeting. However, due to the US opposition 
to this document, the CEO proposed to the Council that in stead of approving the plan, the Council is to take a note of the 
plan (ibid). 
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principle of incremental cost does not always ensure that GEF projects and spending 
are in line with the objective of the Convention. Porter et al. (1998:30-40) have found 
that the portfolio has become dominated by a smaller number of technology 
applications and strategies that are not necessarily related first and foremost to short-
term ghg-reduction, but rather reflect a complex balance of needs and interests. 
Projects are also conceived on an ad hoc basis and do not include coherent, integrated 
approaches to development and environment at the country level. The pragmatic 
approach has also opened up for time-consuming discussions, which has made the 
GEF project cycle notoriously long and can explain why project outcomes are slow in 
emerging. Young (2002:154) has found that the project cycle takes two years on 
average from proposal to final approval, irrespective of the size of the project  
 
Even though the meetings of the Council are of a different character than the meetings 
of the COP and the Assembly, the Council has not fully managed to aggregate actor 
preferences. But the Council has become the main decision-making body of the GEF 
and the decision-rule appears to have been an important factor in that regard.  
Decision-making procedures cannot, however, be analysed without looking at how 
participation affect the members of the regime. I will therefore look at the implications 
of the Council’s rules of access before I sum up how both factors have contributed to 
determining problem-solving capacity, and in turn effectiveness.  
 
Participation 
Following the theoretical proposition in chapter three, target group participation, 
especially when states lack the capacity or interest to ensure effective domestic 
implementation, is expected to provide countries with information on the range of 
policy options, technical feasibility and costs and benefits, and maybe enable them to 
develop a stake in the outcome. In terms of project development, GEF processes do in 
practice become a three-stage process; first at country level involving the IA and the 
respective developing country, followed by approval from the IAs and the GEF 
Secretariat, and then finally, approval by the representatives of the Council. In chapter 
one I mentioned that my primary focus would be the GEF, but since only a few 
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developing countries have direct access to the Council, I find it necessary to look 
closer into how both direct and indirect participation (through multiconstituencies) 
affect the developing countries. 
 
Direct Participation 
Unlike the developed countries, only a few developing countries have direct access to 
the Council. The level of understanding of GEF varies among the different 
constituencies, and the developing countries that display the greatest knowledge of 
GEFs programs and procedures are the few developing countries that benefits from 
both the Council’s rules of access and the GEF’s dual funding strategy. The countries 
that are located in single- or smaller constituencies and as such meet more frequently 
in the Council, are also the largest recipients of GEF funds (see section 4.1.2)62. 
According to Porter et al (1998:93) and Christoffersen et al. (2002:20) Argentina, 
Brazil, China and India are the countries that have developed the greatest project 
design capacity. They have also, although more recently, established effective GEF 
units around the position of the operational focal point (ibid.2002:55). The previous 
chapter found that it was within these developing countries that the first signs of both 
increased awareness of the climate change problem and understanding of cleaner 
technologies emerged. It therefore appears that through their direct involvement with 
the GEF, these countries have acquired knowledge of GEF requirements for both 
project development and approval. These factors together with the financial assistance 
given by the GEF appear to have contributed to GEF’s achievements in these 
countries. 
 
Indirect Participation 
The majority of developing countries are located in multiconstituencies and their main 
sources for information about GEF’s policy options and procedures are their 
constituency representative, the IAs and the GEF Secretariat. The chapter evaluating 
effectiveness found that the general pattern regarding the outcome of GEF-projects is 
that climate change concern has not been incorporated in developing countries’ 
                                                 
62 See Appendix 1 for an overview over the GEF (multi)constituencies. 
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strategies. One factor that contributes to explain this is that GEF information does not 
reach all of GEF’s diverse constituencies.  
 
The indirect form for participation has not been sufficient in order to develop a 
possible target group stake in the outcome, as several constituencies have reported 
problems of both communication and coordination. Many multiconstituencies do not 
meet, and many GEF representatives are unfamiliar with whom their fellow 
constituency members are (Young.2002:93).  
 
Regarding the GEF Secretariat and the IAs, they have very different options for 
sharing information with developing countries. The GEF Secretariat is mainly limited 
to the GEF website, and while information on GEF’s policies, procedures and 
requirements are made available, there are some concerns regardig the extent to which 
developing countries can be fully expected to rely on easy access to the internet 
(Christoffersen et al.2002:84). The IAs do play a more critical role than the GEF 
Secretariat because they are present at country-level, directly involved with project 
development and execution. But the GEF’s connection with the IAs has not 
substantially increased the developing countries’ capacity to implement the FCCC. 
There have been several instances where the assistance given by the IAs has not been 
in conformity with the information given by the Secretariat (Observation.2003). One 
of the reasons for this inconsistency is that neither the World Bank, UNDP nor UNEP 
have done much to integrate the GEF’s objectives and principles in their regular 
operations (GEF Secretariat.2003; Young:2002:108-110). Christoffersen et al. 
(2002:93) have also found that there is a widespread tendency for the IAs to omit 
giving credit to GEF. GEF is therefore not well known nor understood in developing 
countries, because of lack of incentives for both the IAs and the focal points to 
promote it. The IAs are, however, not the only possible agencies engaged in GEF-
processes, as the GEF practices a very open strategy towards NGOs both in the 
Council and at project-level. 
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Participation by Non-Members 
The theoretical framework of this study did not make any definitive assumptions 
regarding the effect of NGO participation, as scholars make different claims in that 
regard. Within the GEF, however, NGOs were brought in with the intention of 
providing consulting or training services to actors within the respective developing 
countries, but their inclusion in the institutional setting of the GEF has been 
counterproductive. Both Christoffersen et al. (2002:79) and Porter et al. (1998:32) 
have found that the relationship between the developing countries and NGOs is 
tenuous and unproductive. For a variety of political, social and cultural reasons, many 
developing countries have not established collaborative relationships with civil society 
groups. It therefore appears that the inclusion of the NGOs have not contributed to 
enhance the GEF’s problem-solving capacity. 
 
The exclusion of the majority of GEF’s target group from its main governing body has 
therefore resulted in weak in-country understanding of GEF. There is still little clarity 
or knowledge, even among key stakeholders about GEF and its goals, structure, and 
program modalities. GEF are projects by their very nature seldom straightforward or 
“simple”, but the GEF project cycle has become extremely long, and while this can be 
partly explained by the incremental cost criterion, it can also be traced back to the 
developing countries lack of knowledge of the GEF.  
 
The delays in getting projects off the ground have had wider implications for the 
effectiveness of the GEF. Porter et al. (1998:65-66) have found that a longer process 
does often increase transaction costs without contributing equivalent to the project63. 
But probably more important is the effect it has had on the private sector. The private 
sector was intended to be a valuable participant in GEF projects by assisting in 
technology transfer, by providing co-financing and by replicating GEF projects in 
particular. The mismatch between the long GEF project cycle and the often short time 
scale for private sector investment decisions has become a significant barrier for 
                                                 
63 They may raise costs by increasing the length of time required for a project concept to reach the implementation stage by 
increasing the staff time and “nuisance cost” of getting a proposal through the approval process successfully, or by 
discouraging the submission of proposals to GEF that would advance its objectives (ibid). 
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private sector involvement with the GEF. GEF processes are perceived to be too 
complex and cumbersome, stifling potential GEF private sector initiatives 
(GEF/C.22/Inf.10.2003:5). Other publicly financed development agencies have also 
found the GEF’s requirements too demanding for the limited funds it made available 
(Young.2002:138). While one could possibly argue that lack of replication is a 
consequence of the low number of completed projects, Christoffersen et al. (2002:22) 
have pointed out that the most important factors inhibiting replication is the lack of an 
enabling environment for business in some client countries and the frequently low 
involvement of the private sector in GEF projects. It should be noted that a long 
project cycle does not always have to be negative. Evaluations (Porter et al.ibid; 
Christoffersen et al.2002:91) have found instances in which the delay had ultimately 
improved project design, implementation or both. But given the effect the delays has 
had on private sector involvement, the long project cycle appear to be an important 
factor in explaining the lack of both project outcomes and replication of projects. 
 
In terms of GEF’s problem-solving capacity, the previous section has shown that 
GEF’s ability to make decisions under the decision-rule of consensus has been low 
both in the COP and the Assembly. In order to be able to avoid issue-linking and 
inexplicit decisions, the GEF has had to rely on the Council’s consensus with 
provisions and a more restrictive approach to rule of access. But while this latter 
approach has contributed to making decision-making easier, it has had a decisive 
impact on the Council’s ability to function as a channel for information. GEF’s main 
forum appears to function as a channel for information for the countries that have the 
opportunity to frequently meet in the Council. This has not been the case for the 
countries limited to indirect participation through their constituency representative or 
through cooperation with the IAs. The institutional setting of the GEF has therefore 
run into two incompatible challenges; while a more restrictive approach to 
participation together with a decision rule with formal voting provisions appear to be 
necessary to ensure GEF’s capacity to make decisions, this approach simultaneously 
put constraints on target group participation by inhibiting GEF’s capacity to share 
information. The GEF has recently begun to target this downside of its operations, by 
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conducting workshops. These workshops are a joint effort by the GEF Secretariat and 
the IAs, aimed at informing about the GEF, its mission, strategy, policies, and 
procedures64. However, it is too early to determine the impact of these workshops as of 
today. I will instead move on to look at the remaining GEF forum. 
 
The Replenishments 
The last GEF forum differs from the others in that it targets the developed countries’ 
responsibilities within the GEF. A core feature of the GEF is that of a fund, and the 
cornerstone of this convention was the understanding that developed countries would 
provide financial assistance to developing countries for measures they undertake that 
primarily benefit the global environment (Clémencon.2000:5). The following figure 
offers a presentation of the various GEF Replenishments. 
 
Pilot Programme (1991) USD 1.5 billion 
Replenishment GEF1 1994 USD 2 billion  
Replenishment GEF2 1998 USD  2,75 billion 
Replenishment GEF3 2002 USD 2,97 billion 
 
Figure 5.1 The Replenishments of the GEF Trust Fund  
 
As this figure shows, the GEF has managed to ensure a stable flow of resources, but 
the process for replenishing the Fund has not been as straightforward as the figure 
indicates. The number of donor countries has remained fairly constant, but the 
replenishment process has developed into time-consuming negotiations65.  One of the 
difficulties of the Replenishments has been that the developed countries have no been 
able to agree on how to fund the GEF66 (Botnen.1997:35). The Replenishments do 
                                                 
64 Between 2000 and 2003, 39 countries have participated in workshops under the Country Dialogue Workshop Programme. 
 6532 countries have contributed to the GEF’s core fund, these are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Ivory Coast, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, and the United States. 
66At one end of the spectrum there France, Germany, UK, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries which agree on having a 
core-fund made of grants, but cannot decide how countries should contribute. France favoured voluntary contributions, while 
Germany wanted a more rigorous burden-sharing arrangement. At the other end are the US, Japan and Australia, in favour of 
co-financing (grants/concessional terms) emphasizing a larger degree of control over how resources are spent (ibid). 
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therefore to some extent reflect the trouble with international aid in general. Both 
Lafferty and Langhelle (1999:147) and Gupta (1997:115) have stressed that transfer of 
international aid is fraught with issues such as control over resource use67.  The current 
setting of the Replenishments, based on the burden-sharing formula described in 
chapter two and pledged contributions, was not in place until 1997. Pledge is, 
however, a financial term frequently used in the area of finance, and it refers to a 
voluntary commitment, or an announcement, but its binding nature remained 
ambiguous68 (Mintzer and Leonard.1994:86). Several of the GEF’s donor countries 
are, or have been, in arrears, and the effect of these arrears are enhanced by the burden 
sharing of the Replenishments69 (GEF/C.22/Inf.3). When countries’ contributions fall 
below their pledged contribution, the setting offers a pro rata provision to other 
countries giving them a right to defer commitment, either by reducing their share or by 
making some of their shares unavailable for Council allocation70. Because of this, the 
replenishment process has needed several meetings to try to sort out both the total 
level of funding, countries’ individual contributions, and the status of arrears in 
particular. While the time-consuming process of replenishing the Trust Fund do add to 
impression of the GEF as a cumbersome and complicated system, the level of 
resources given to the GEF is high at least when one consider that the ODA declined 
from 0.3 percent of World GDP in 1990 to 0.2 percent in 1999 (Christoffersen et 
al.2002:11).  
  
In the theoretical framework, I briefly discussed that financial organizations might fail 
because of lack of resources, but in the case of GEF the reductions in country 
contributions have not been substantial in terms of the GEF’s total financial 
revenues71. But the decrease in ODA does raise a critical question related to the 
replenishments and GEF resources, whether or not the developed countries’ 
                                                 
67 According to Lafferty and Langhelle (ibid) the OECD countries do not like the developing countries to have too much 
influence on resource-allocation, fearing resources to be used for purposes they were not meant for. 
68 This concept was introduced by Japan to move beyond a growing impasse in the FCCC-negotiations concerning its 
financial mechanism (ibid).  
69 See Appendix 2 for an overview of countries’ contributions. 
70 Large donor countries such as Austria, France, Germany and Japan have exercised their pro rata right because the US has 
reduced its funding below what it pledged in 1994 (Botnen.1997:106).  
71 To date, the contributions that are not available for Council allocation due to either delays in payments or exercise of pro 
rate rights totals USD 358.1 million. 
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contributions to the GEF represent new and additional resources. International treaty 
language does not provide an operational definition of “new and additional”72, and 
although it is difficult to distinguish between the resources made available to the GEF 
and ODA-resources, some comments can be made. Botnen (1997:105) has found that 
the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) decided in 1994 that 84 
percent of the contributions made to GEF could be counted as ODA73. While this 
question does not necessarily have a direct effect on the institutional setting as a 
determinant of effectiveness, it may have an impact on the extent to which the 
resources developed countries make available through the GEF, can become a 
financial incentive. Following the theoretical propositions, financial incentives must 
provide actors with expectations to reap net benefit, or at least not lose. If ODA has 
been diverted to the GEF, it is a negative-sum game for the developing countries. 
There is no way of knowing whether or not ODA would have declined in the absence 
of the GEF, but the developing countries would at least get to spend all of the available 
assistance according to their own national priorities. I will return to the issue of GEF 
resources in subsequent sections. The important thing to note is that while the GEF has 
managed to ensure a stable flow of resources, the Replenishments do show that the 
issue of resource transfer is difficult. It has not only complicated what was initially 
intended to be a more straightforward process for funding the GEF, but it has also 
raised concern related to what GEF resources represent. 
 
Summing up the Institutional Setting 
This section has shown that the difficulties faced in the institutional setting mirrors the 
trouble associated with international aid in general. As mentioned above, the forum for 
securing GEF resources has since the establishment of the GEF worked on issues 
related to the burden sharing of the Replenishments, particularly the level and 
ambiguous nature of developed countries contributions. The forums for policy-making 
and project approval have, on the other hand, had to handle the main task of 
                                                 
72 By, for example defining a base year against which ODA and GEF resource flows should compared. Developing countries 
have usually considered 1992 “the year of Rio Conference” to be the base year, whereas many donor countries maintain that 
“new and additional” simply refers to funding efforts that go beyond the level of ODA resources that would have been 
allocated without the existence of GEF (Porter et al.1998:5). 
73 He has also found evidence suggesting that the US contributions have been redirected from the normal USAID budget 
since the pilot phase (ibid). 
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distributing the cost between the developed and the developing countries, which has 
only been partially resolved by the Council’s operations. While the incremental costs 
criterion has been an obstacle to the implementation, the pragmatic approach of the 
Council has to some extent made the process easier. But as a consequence project 
outcomes have as not always generated results that meet the objective of the FCCC. 
The institutional setting is nevertheless only one of the three factors that determines 
problem-solving capacity. The remaining two factors are the topic for the next 
sections. 
 
5.1.2 Power and Leadership 
In chapter three I made the assumption that powerful actors or instrumental leaders can 
play an important role in regimes. This section will focus on the extent to which such 
actors have contributed to determine the effectiveness of the GEF. Both powerful 
actors and instrumental leaders can be identified by the mechanism they work as well 
as by the kind of capabilities required to succeed. 
 
5.1.2.1 Power 
Following the assumption made in the theoretical framework, the distribution of power 
or capabilities among the members of a regime can be seen as given. As previously 
mentioned the power of the Council is skewed towards the developed countries and 
the differentiated relationship comprised of donor and recipient countries do to some 
extent open up for power based on financial capabilities. While financial capability is a 
necessary condition, it is not by itself sufficient for the emergence of powerful actors. 
An actor must possess both the capability in terms of economic resources and the will 
to provide them to qualify as a powerful actor. In the theoretical framework, such 
actors are conceived of as pushers. The opposite of pushers is laggards. While none of 
the developed countries have displayed non-cooperative behaviour, one country has 
been a more hesitant participant than others.   
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The US has been a reluctant participant since the beginning, it initially argued in 
favour of shutting GEF down after the three-year pilot phase 74(Botnen.1997:35). The 
US has not been inclined to endow the facility with significant independent (financial) 
power. It only agreed to become a donor of the independent GEF if it was allowed to 
count some of its co-financing and bilateral grants or highly concessional grants as 
part of its GEF contributions75 (Sydnes.1991:161; von Molkte.1997:257).  Reluctance 
is not, however, sufficient to qualify as a laggard in international cooperation, and 
initially, the US’ reluctance towards funding the GEF through contributions to the 
Trust Fund did not have much of an impact on the other developed countries. But as 
the actual funding level of the US fell below what it pledged to the Trust Fund, some 
countries found it difficult to justify to their authorities why they should contribute a 
proportionally greater share than bigger countries (Sjøberg.1999:36)76. In the section 
of the replenishment I did mention that the burden-sharing system magnifies the 
effects of arrears, but due to US size and power, Foot et al. (2003:15) also argue that 
US behaviour, and possibly unilateralism, is a major concern to other states. The 
position that the US bestow within the setting of the GEF becomes more prevailing 
when one looks at US efforts to alter the principles for GEF’s approval of projects.  
 
According to the MoU, the US not should have any influence over decisions 
concerning funding eligibility within the setting of the GEF, as this is a matter to be 
handled by the COP. But through financial promises made in the Replenishments, the 
US has managed to bring the issue of a new funding system before the Council77. The 
reason why the US made a case in favour of changing the entire system for project 
approval in the Replenishments meetings, and not in the other more appropriate 
forums, is that its influence is larger in the forum that raises financial revenues. The 
financial resources behind this demand do not represent an increase in the US’ share, it 
                                                 
74 The US was supported by Canada and Australia, as they saw GEF as a temporary mean for integrating global environment 
concerns in the development assistance of the UN and the World Bank until such integration became standard (ibid). 
75 During the pilot GEF, the US only funded climate-related efforts that had already been sponsored by other donors.  
76 Sjøberg (ibid) claims that some countries were willing to work out an arrangement to compensate for the US contributions, 
but that this was ruled out when France and Germany used their pro rata provision. 
77 The US wants the GEF to determine country eligibility for funding based on country performance, and proposed  an 
allocation system based on the core principles of selectivity, accountability and results. The “best” performers would be 
eligible for a greater share of the resources, while the poorer performers would be eligible for capacity building or enabling 
activities (GEF/R.3/CRP.3). The US position does not conceive of performance in environmental terms, but on country 
performance more generally (Observation.2003). 
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is an amount that corresponds to the sum that would clear the US’ arrears78. The 
Council has nevertheless set in motion a process for incorporating the US’ request of 
country performance as a criterion for project selection. According to Miles et al. 
(2002:29) the privilege of being either a pusher or a laggard, is the ability to pursue 
one’s own interests without having to worry about what other might wish or do. Since 
the US has managed to bring such a controversial issue on to the Council agenda it 
appears as if the political and economic power of the USA is of such a magnitude that 
it comes close to wielding a veto on its own. 
 
US’ behaviour does not contribute to enhance GEF’s problem-solving capacity. As 
seen in the previous sections, one of the most difficult tasks faced by the GEF has been 
to develop a consistent procedure for project approval. The demand made by the US 
has reopened the discussion that until now had been somewhat resolved by the 
pragmatic use of incremental costs. Furthermore by emphasizing country performance, 
the US diverts attention away from purpose of GEF’s, to generate global 
environmental benefits. That both country groupings have subdued to the demands of 
US is nevertheless evidence of the important role the US bestow within the GEF. The 
participation of the US was, and still is, a necessary requirement for the GEF to be a 
credible force, as it is with virtually all-global agreements.  
 
While the political and economic power has been critical to US influence in the GEF, 
US influence as a determinant effectiveness, works against the purpose of the GEF. It 
has as such been the main laggard within the GEF setting. Power is nevertheless not 
the only resource available for influence in the GEF, the impact on problem-solving 
capacity can therefore not be drawn solely based on the role of the US. 
 
5.1.2.2 Instrumental Leadership 
Unlike power, instrumental leadership usually stems from officials, enjoying status 
due to their position within the regime in question. Such leaders can be further 
                                                 
78 Initially, the US pledge to the 2002-replenishment was intended to partially clear its arrears. However, the amount of 
70USDmillion (of 500 USDmilllion) to be given to the GEF during the last year of the Replenishment period (2005) was 
made contingent upon the achievement of certain performance measures. (GEF/R.3/36.2002:24). 
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distinguished from powerful actors, in that it is their individual capacities rather than 
their material capabilities that enable them to become leaders.  
 
That much was vested in the position of the GEF CEO was imminent already during 
the restructuring of the GEF. Developing countries demanded that an independent 
CEO headed the GEF as opposed to the pilot phase GEF that was chaired by a World 
Bank official. Status or position of authority do, however, only serve as basis for 
leadership, in order to become an instrumental leader the GEF CEO must display 
personal qualities or skill and competence, or both, and devote time and energy, to 
qualify as a leader. El-Ashry began to emerge as a source for leadership during the 
restructuring negotiations of the GEF. Chapter two described how these negotiations 
broke down, and Sjøberg (1999:45) has found that El-Ashry became somewhat of 
mediator between developed and developing countries by devoting much effort into 
reengaging both country groupings in the restructuring process79. The need for 
instrumental leadership has also been prevailing in the restructured GEF and the CEO 
has continued to invest much time and efforts, both inside and outside the GEF 
forums.  
 
One of the tasks of the CEO is to handle the agenda of the meetings, but there are 
according to Malnes (1995:96) both effective and ineffective ways to present 
solutions, and the skill is to identify what matters to the people. El-Ashry developed 
the practice of traveling to meet with Council members prior to the Council meetings 
to discuss the up and coming agenda (Hofseth.2003). While he may not always have 
succeeded in inducing them to accept a particular line of policy, this practice enabled 
him to find out what Council members would find acceptable and unacceptable. This 
has clearly contributed to a more efficient duration of the Council meetings as seen by 
the procedures utilized to avoid a fall out among the Council representatives (see 
section 5.1.1.2). The Council has become somewhat dependent on the CEO to handle 
                                                 
79 According to Sjøberg (ibid) El-Ashry managed to establish a level of confidence between the negotiating parties and his 
mediating efforts were perceived by both country blocs as being impartial.  
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arrangements and manage the agenda of the meetings and avoid being held ransom by 
hours of political speeches common in the UN system (Young.2002:96). 
 
The CEO has also been authorized together with the GEF Secretariat to approve 
projects under the two annual intersessional work programs. Even though these 
projects, are smaller in size and funds, this arrangement have become important in 
terms of GEFs problem-solving capacity. The CEO has also been allowed to practice 
the incremental cost criterion with a little leeway and his approval has shortened the 
project cycle (for these projects) since they do not have to pass through the Council, at 
the same time, the allocation of resources remains under the control of the GEF, 
through the CEO80.  
 
Countries perception of El-Ashry is not, however, solely based on the skill and energy 
he has invested. There are several features rooted in his persona that has contributed to 
make him credible as a leader. To some extent he represents both worlds (developed 
and developing) since El-Ashry originally is from a developing country (Egypt), but is 
now an American citizen. In addition to his former position as a director in the World 
Bank Environment Department, which was an important factor for developed 
countries favouring World Bank influence in the GEF, El-Ashry had also been 
employed for a long time at the less political World Resource Institute (WRI). 
Together with his individual capacities, these features provided El-Ashy with much 
latitude for the political engineering of acceptable solutions.  
 
Instrumental Leadership vs. Power 
Regimes can, as seen here, be affected by several sources. Instrumental leadership was 
expected to be the most difficult to supply, and El-Ashry has not succeeded in all his 
efforts. As a result of the constraints on the GEF Trust Fund, El-Ashry stopped one of 
the GEF’s intersessional work programs, and warned that further work program 
adjustments would be made in accordance with funding constraints. While this was 
                                                 
80 While Council approval is not the largest source for delay, its approval procedure does add to the already long project 
cycle. Although the Council has approved a project, approval is not finalized until at least four weeks after the meeting 
because Council members are given the opportunity to review the projects and return the proposal with additional comments. 
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aimed at the US’s arrears, El-Ashry’s efforts did not manage to make sufficient 
pressure on the US. This picture seems to be transferable to the effects of power and 
instrumental leadership on the GEF’s member states. Material capabilities working 
against the GEF occur to have had a stronger impact than individual capacities 
advocating the role of the GEF. This is not particularly surprising though, considering 
that actors are likely to be more convinced by powerful actors than instrumental 
leaders without material capabilities. In the case of GEF, power has not contributed to 
enhancing effectiveness, but instrumental leadership may have outweighed some of 
the impact that the negative power exerted by the US would have had on effectiveness 
in the absence of the efforts of the GEF CEO. I did assume (see chapter three) that if 
power and leadership prevailed during the operations of the regime, the more impact 
such resources could have on actor behaviour. But since powerful actors and 
instrumental leadership leaders work in opposite direction of each other, they have not 
managed to influence the actors to the extent that it has had a positive impact on 
effectiveness. 
 
5.1.3 Summing up Problem-Solving Capacity 
This chapter has so far explored three determinants that contribute to explain 
effectiveness. The section analysing the impact of the institutional setting found that 
aggregating actor preferences by decoupling issues has proven to be difficult under the 
decision rule of concensus. But the GEF’s problem-solving capacity has to some 
extent been enhanced by the Council provisions for formal voting, it appears that such 
procedures has managed to overcome some of the obstacles faced in the COP and the 
Assembly. The flexible approach towards both decision-making and participation was 
expected to lead to more effective regime implementation, and to some extent this 
have been confirmed. However, it seems like the participatory approach mainly has 
benefited the developing countries included in all the GEF forums. The exclusive 
approach, on the other hand, appears to have prevented other developing countries in 
developing a stake in the outcome. 
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Regarding the two other determinants of effectiveness, power and instrumental 
leadership, both appear to have loomed large within the GEF. The most powerful actor 
has managed to convince other actors to comply, not on the basis of the merits of their 
solution, but because of the position the actor bestows. By withholding resources and 
seeking to alter the eligibility criteria for GEF allocation, the US has not contributed to 
enhance the GEF’s problem-solving capacity. Instrumental leadership, on the other 
hand, has. The formal status of the CEO provided El-Ashry with the opportunity to be 
a leader, but it was the skill and energy that he provided both inside and outside the 
GEF forums that made his efforts qualify as an instrumental leader. Since countries, 
both developed and developing, have become dependent on the GEF CEO to manage 
meetings, this can be seen as evidence of their faith in El-Ashrys guidance and 
entrepreneurial skills. By affecting actor behaviour to the extent that they accept his 
means to find common goals, the CEO has played an instrumental role in GEF’s 
achievements.  
 
Effectiveness is not only a function of an organization’s problem-solving capacity; the 
remaining part of this chapter will focus on the second independent variable of this 
analysis, problem characteristics. 
 
5.2 Problem Characteristics 
This section will seek to identify the problems associated with the climate change 
problem, and how they affect effectiveness. As explained in chapter three, problem 
characteristics will also be used to match notion of problem-solving capacity with 
problem type and task. 
 
5.2.1 Political Problem Characteristics 
Following the theoretical framework discussed in chapter three, there are two main 
types of environmental problems; those, which are caused by lack of coordination, and 
those, which are caused by problems of incongruity. Most attention will be paid to 
problems characterized by incongruity because such problems have a greater impact 
on effectiveness in the long run.  
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Incongruity problems arise because there is asymmetry between individual and 
collective costs and benefits. While the Convention focuses on the stabilization of ghg-
emissions, it simultaneously stresses the imbalance between the countries of the North 
and countries of the South. Previous chapters have elaborated on differences in 
capacity, but the imbalances between the two country groupings are also prevailing 
when one assess other problem characteristics.  
 
5.2.1.1 A Problem of Incongruity 
As mentioned in chapter three, scientific uncertainty and complexity would be 
included to the extent that it has affected problem malignancy/benigness. With respect 
to the political intellectual complexity, I find in the case of the climate change problem 
and the GEF, this type of uncertainty to be low. With the exception of an early period, 
when scientists were working to increase the knowledge base on climate change 
(which led to both the establishment of the pilot GEF and later the FCCC), the 
understanding of the problem has been solid81. IPCC has concluded that in order to 
ensure that global pollution does not exceed the carrying capacity of the earth’s 
environment, global emissions must be reduced by at least 70 percent over the next 
100 years to stabilize CO2 concentrations82. Such reductions are not possible without 
significant and rapid improvements in energy efficiency and a shift to renewable 
energy (Bright et al.2003:87). There is still scientific debate about global warming, but 
most of it focuses on various feedback effects, and how climate change will affect 
specific countries or regions, and as such fall outside the scope of this study. 
 
Following the theoretical propositions, problems of incongruity become particularly 
hard to solve through voluntary cooperation to the extent that they are also 
characterized by asymmetry. When costs and benefits are highly asymmetrically 
                                                 
81 Prior to 1990s the climate change had primarily been an issue within the scientific arena, as understanding of the 
greenhouse problem developed. The scientific progress was rapid during this period, mainly due to IPCC. (Torvanger et 
al.2001:55). The IPCC is an intergovernmental scientific and technical body with a small secretariat and a worldwide 
network of scientists who assess the results of scientific research. It was set up in 1988, by UNEP and WMO (World 
Meteorological Organization).  
82Critics of of the IPCC argue that the link between global warming and ghg emissions is the result of  a theoretical model 
and not reality. Others argue that human emissions are small and well within the natural climatic variability IPCC 
(Gupta.1997:8). 
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distributed conflicts tend to increase, and this is likely to be reinforced if the problem 
or activity in question stem from point sources that are easy to identify (Skjærseth. 
2000:44). To identify potential point sources, it is necessary to look at countries’ 
emissions profiles. 
 
Asymmetry in Emissions Profiles 
Emissions of ghgs have increased dramatically in the last century through fossil fuel 
burning and land-use changes. Human activities have pushed atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide, the main ghg, to more than 30 percent above pre-
industrial levels. Current and future emissions will continue to add to that 
accumulation. 
 
Developed countries are responsible for about 63 percent of net carbon emissions from 
fossil fuel burning and land use changes since 1990 (Baumer and Kete.2002:2). About 
140 developing countries have contributed a combined 37 percent (ibid). For a 
comparison of the two country groupings emission levels, Gupta (1997:6) has found 
that if past emissions are taken into account, then relative to populations, cumulative 
from 1950, historic fossil fuel carbon emissions from developed countries are eleven 
times as high as those from developing countries. In terms of current emissions the 
figures remain more or less the same for both country groupings. Most current carbon 
emissions originate from 20 or so countries that are either rich, highly populated or 
both. Among the group of developing countries, China’s and India’s contribution of 
ghgs is about 15 percent of the global total, whereas 135 small countries produce less 
than five percent of global carbon emissions (Baumer and Kete.2002:3).  
 
Future emissions profiles will determine the end extent of global climate change. A 
significant increase in emission is expected to occur in the developing countries. The 
developing countries are expected to experience substantial growth, and the largest 
share of this expected growth will primarily come from the burning of fossil fuels 
(Bright et al.2003:85). For a similar comparison of the ratio of developed/developing 
country emissions with future emissions taken into account, projections indicate that 
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by the year 2100, the share of developing countries will have increased to more than 
half of the global emissions. By that time their emissions will be twice the level of 
present worldwide emissions (Gupta.1997:6).   
 
In terms of past and current country profiles, developed countries contribute 
disproportionately to emissions level, indicating that the climate change is 
characterised by a highly asymmetrical distribution of costs and benefits. The 
imbalance is, however, reduced if one includes the expected increase in emissions 
stemming from developing countries. Within such a timeframe the climate change 
problem become global in scope, and all countries, including developing ones, will 
eventually need to control their ghgs emissions. The benigness or maligness of any 
cooperative solution for solving environmental problems is nevertheless also 
dependent on the potential cost incurred and benefits generated for the individual 
actors. 
 
Asymmetry in Costs and Benefits 
Whilst contemplating environmental cooperation and implementation, the cost of 
emissions is a central issue for many countries. According to Baumer and Kete 
(2002:2) there are literally dozens of economic projections of the costs and benefits of 
climate policy. In the theoretical framework I argued that three general aspects can be 
of significance, the ratio of costs to benefits; the distribution of those cost and benefits; 
and “strategic” considerations such as international economic competitiveness. In the 
case of climate change, however, costs and benefits cannot be assessed without 
incorporating countries’ ability to control emissions.  
 
The difference in countries’ emissions profiles as described in the previous section, 
have implications for the prospective costs and benefits connected with activities to 
control emissions. For many developed countries, which emit large quantities of ghgs, 
emissions reductions are likely to be accompanied by a decrease in growth and have 
large consequences for their competitive situations. Developing countries, on the other 
hand, have relatively inefficient sectors, and any increase in their efficiency would be 
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compensated by the volume of growth (Gupta.1997:6). One reason why emissions are 
low in developing countries is that many energy-consuming technologies have not yet 
penetrated widely. Climate friendly activities in developing countries will therefore 
yield greater environmental benefits than similar activities in developed countries. 
Developing countries are, however, typically considered to be more vulnerable. 
Vulnerability in terms of climate change is defined by Torvanger (2001:14) as the 
degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of 
climate change, including climate variability and extremes. In the case of developing 
countries this means that resources to undergo such changes, in addition to cope with 
the impacts of climate change, are not readily available. Although there are variations 
within the group of developing countries pertaining to the differences in countries’ 
development level, the developing countries are more vulnerable than the group of 
developed countries.  
 
Summing up the above sections, I find that in the case of the climate change problem, 
both the domain in which past and current emissions have occurred/will occur, and 
where climate-activities are assumed to generate more results relative to the potential 
costs incurred, are identifiable. The problem is characterized by a highly asymmetrical 
distribution and the extent to which this distributions have affected problem 
malignancy is the topic for the subsequent sections. 
 
5.2.2 Matching Problem-Solving Capacity with Problem Type and Task 
In the following, I will attempt to the match GEF’s problem-solving capacity with 
problem type and task. Following the theoretical propositions it is reasonable to 
assume that the more asymmetrical an incongruity problem, the more difficult it will 
be to find a solution that is acceptable to all parties and that such problems often 
requires higher levels or perhaps more complex arrangements of cooperation.  
 
5.2.2.1 Problem Characteristics and the Distribution of Costs and Benefits 
As seen in previous sections, one of the major obstacles faced by the GEF has been to 
reach an agreement on how to distribute the costs of its climate-projects. This is a 
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defining characteristic of a malign problem. In terms of international environmental 
cooperation in general, OECD countries adopted in 1972 the polluter pays principle as 
a guideline for allocating cost of pollution control (Clémencon.2000:15).  In the case 
of the climate change problem and developing countries, this principle has been 
applied with some modifications. To some extent the cost-sharing scheme has been 
based on developing countries’ lack of resources and developed countries 
responsibility for past emissions. But, the different ratios between costs and benefits 
can also contribute to explain this solution. Faced with significant domestic costs, 
developed countries have stressed that climate-measures should be based on both 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Since developing countries have relatively 
inefficient industrial sectors, the climate change problem can be more cost-effectively 
handled in developing countries than in developed countries83 (Botnen.1997:34; 
Gupta.1997:6).  Developing countries have, on the other hand, approached the 
problem differently. 
 
Due to the asymmetry in past emissions, developing countries have tended to perceive 
the climate change problem as a Northern/Western problem rather than a global 
problem (Bodansky.1995:31; Gupta 1997:17). That the expected future increase in 
emissions in developing countries will be a consequence of economic growth means 
that the issue of climate protection has become embedded in a development context 
(Bodansky.ibid; Mintzer and Leonard.1994:84)84. The developing countries have 
therefore tended to find the polluter pays principle unfair within the context of climate 
change as they hold the developed countries responsible for causing the problem. 
Given the developmental utility these countries have placed on the climate change 
problem, they had trouble with accepting that they only will be reimbursed for the 
global environmental benefits that the projects generate.  
 
                                                 
83 Two countries in particular, Norway and Japan, emphasized the role of developing countries (Bodansky.1995:29) . 
84 The developing countries had prior to the Earth Summit in Rio, insisted that the proposed environmental conference in 
1992 give equal weight to environment and development. In the climate context, they argued that climate change be viewed 
not simply as an environmental issue but as a developmental issue (Bodansky.ibid). Mintzer and Leonard (ibid) have also 
found evidence for such a way for problem framing climate change from a developing country perspective.  
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In the theoretical framework I briefly mentioned that is difficult to separate behavior 
steming from lack of interest from lack of willingness, as both types of behavior are in 
line with the propositions derived from the rational actor model. Regarding the 
developing countries lack of interest, I find it often equally difficult to distinguish 
between problems that arise from low developing country interest for the environment 
from the problems that arise from absence of ability, especially when one are looking 
at such a diverse group as the developing countries. Environmental cooperation is 
often affected by countries favoring cost-avoidance, and the GEF provides little 
incentive for developing countries to try to limit the growth of their emissions, as few 
schemes are likely to be implemented unless developed countries agree to meet the 
costs. In light of the decline in ODA mentioned earlier, the developing countries have 
nonetheless become very protective of scarce financial resources for economic 
development, and among these resources are the financial assistance made available 
through the GEF. It appears that the GEF has in a few cases managed to create some 
developing countries interest in establishing a strategy for mitigating climate change, 
but many countries remain uninterested. Many developing countries do claim that they 
do not have the means to either begin working on climate change or continue working 
after project completion and ceased financial assistance (Interviews Developing 
country representatives.2003). A common feature to the group of developing countries 
is, nevertheless, that global environmental benefits in themselves do not tend to 
receive high priority. Porter et al. (1998:32) have found that such concerns must be 
linked to social and economic priorities, mainly poverty eradication to attract attention. 
For countries reluctant to commit resources to sustainable practices in energy and so 
forth, it appears to be both financially and politically easier to support the monitoring 
and institutional kinds of activities, especially in light of GEF’s full cost-support of 
these activities85(ibid:35). Actors are, however, not only affected by financial 
incentives or lack thereof, actor utility can also be altered by the organization that 
governs the resources flow. 
                                                 
85 According to Amous et al (2000:3) the enabling activity program experienced constraints in the form of funding limitations 
in some countries.  
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5.2.2.2 Problem Characteristics and Institutional Arrangements 
It also appears that problem characteristics have had a bearing on the institutional 
arrangements that govern GEF’s resource flow. As seen under section 5.1.1 GEF’s 
problem-solving capacity has been impeded with difficulties due to the participatory 
approach of the Council. The task of matching rules of access with problem scope has 
been problematic because of the differentiated roles of the GEF member states. The 
climate change problem is global in scope due to the extent of past and future 
emissions; the problem focus of the GEF is narrower since it is designed to target 
developing countries activities under the Convention. Climate cooperation in the case 
of GEF is, however, also a matter of international environmental aid, and in order for 
the developed countries to fund the GEF and remain some control over the spending of 
their resources, their roles as donors had to be reflected in GEF’s main forum.  
Developed and developing countries have clashed over the dominant role of the 
developed countries, together with their voting power, since the GEF is designed to 
contribute to shape the development path of the developing countries86. Because 
international transfer involves the provisions of funds by one set of countries in order 
to alter the operational modalities of others, conflicts of interest are endemic. In order 
to reduce the conflict level, it became necessary for the GEF to practice a more 
restrictive approach to participation in the Council, but the exclusion of the developing 
countries have had a negative impact on their interest in entering climate cooperation 
through the GEF. Conflicts of interest do, however, not just come from interactions 
between governments. 
 
Another consequence of malign problem is that the cooperative arrangements often 
become more complex. The developing countries’ interactions with the GEF IAs and 
NGOs account for the longest part of the project cycle, and it appears that GEFs 
connection with the IAs, the World Bank in particular, has given the GEF a credibility 
problem in developing countries. Harstad and Ramankutty (2002:11) have found that 
even in China, the largest recipient country of GEF funds, GEF’s credibility has been 
                                                 
86 Developing countries initially demanded that their numerical superiority should be reflected in the Council. But they 
eventually agreed to the current setting because they hoped it would provide an incentive for the developed countries to 
contribute financially (Sjøberg.1999:30-31). 
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low. Even though the GEF is an independent organization, it is administratively 
supported by the World Bank, and the Bank is responsible for the largest bulk of GEF-
projects, many developing countries therefore still see the GEF as being strongly 
affiliated with the World Bank87 (Christoffersen et al.2002:100; Mintzer and 
Leonard.1994:260). Many countries do not show much interest in being proactive 
towards GEF, and many countries have cited working with the IAs as a reason for their 
lack of involvement88. There are, however, several examples of project delays caused 
by bickering between the IAs over the right to projects (Christoffersen et al.2002:95). 
Such turf battles were particularly prevailing in the early days of the financial 
mechanism. Regarding the expectation that the IAs would mobilize additional 
resources to GEF grants, Christoffersen et al. (2002:66) have found that this have had 
some clear limitations89. The complexity of the GEF therefore appear to not only have 
discouraged developing countries interest and possibly willingness to enter into 
climate-cooperation, but it has also given rise to multiple sources of delay throughout 
the GEF project cycle which have made it difficult to amplify the outcomes of GEF 
processes.  
 
The developing countries’ acceptance of the GEF as a financial mechanism was a 
compromise (Fairman; 1996:56; Young; 2002:64). Only a few developing countries 
participated in the establishment of the pilot GEF, and their expanded participation in 
the restructuring did reduce their discontent, but not entirely. The compromise solution 
as seen here show the many problems with the introduction of a new practice. Problem 
characteristics have had a profound bearing on the GEF’s problem-solving capacity as 
government officials almost always viewed the GEF projects cycle as too lengthy and 
                                                 
87 According to Sjøberg  (1994:2) dissilusion with multilateral organizations would not come in the form of new international 
organizations breeding new bureaucracy. For the developed countries, it was preferable to establish the financial mechanism 
on existing institutions, particularly the World Bank which they saw as a mean to ensure the cost effectiveness of GEF-
activities. An “indicative target ratio” allocating 70 percentof GEF funds to World Bank investment projects and 30 percent 
to UNDP technical assistance was decided already in 1991 (Botnen.1997: 72). 
88 Porter et al. (1998:21-22) found three patterns of developing country involvement/collaboration with the IAs whilst 
developing projects. In the first, project proposals clearly originated and reflected predominantly the influence of the 
respective developing country, albeit clear signs of IAs playing a major role. The two other patterns indicate much less 
developing country involvement. The second pattern was one in which the IAs came up with the idea, but also included input 
from the developing country.  The last pattern reflected little country participation in neither design nor development. 
89At a time when UN agencies generally face severe budget constraints, and when the external debt problems for many 
developing countries constrain their ability and willingness to assume the debt burden inherent in funding from the World 
Bank and reginal development banks, it no longer seems realistic to assume that IA co-financing can become the main 
leverage for the GEF (ibid).  
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cumbersome, especially in view of the size of the grants (Porter et al.1998:65). In 
terms of aid, the GEF is perceived as just one of many donors in the field 
(Clémencon.2000:8). Within such a context, financial assistance is not likely to have 
much of an impact on actor utility, and few countries have displayed much interest in 
neither the climate change problem nor its solution as given by the GEF. Under such 
conditions, the likelihood that an effective regime will emerge is small.  
 
5.2.3 Summing up Problem Characteristics 
This chapter attempted to identify the problems of the climate change problem, and to 
see how they contribute to explain effectiveness. In pure collective-action games, 
where all actors are affected by the problem to the same degree, joint effective 
solutions can be reached because all actors have an incentive to cooperate if other 
actors choose a cooperative strategy too. The problem of climate change cannot be 
seen as pure collective action game, because there is an asymmetrical relationship 
between the actors involved. There are two defining characteristics that contribute to 
make the climate change problem particularly intractable, the asymmetry in emissions 
and the corresponding costs and benefits of these emissions together with the 
differences in countries capabilities. By assigning a financial mechanism for 
developing country implementation, problem malignancy could have been reduced if 
GEF provided the developing countries with a financial incentive to undertake 
climate-activities. The last part of this chapter did, however, find that the majority of 
countries are not interested in undertaking climate change activities unless it related to 
development issues. The institutional arrangements governing the resources flow have 
also affected developing countries position on the climate change issue. The GEF has 
not been sufficient in increasing their interest, willingness and/or ability to continue 
working with climate change after project completion. The GEF therefore reflects the 
difficulties in designing an international organization for international environmental 
cooperation, particularly in the case of environmental aid.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusions and Theoretical Implications 
 
This last chapter will sum up the most important findings of this study and discuss the 
shortcomings that I have encountered in terms of theoretical and empirical difficulties, 
and methodological challenges. Lastly, I will briefly comment on the GEF and its 
future operations. 
 
6.1 Empirical Findings 
This section will try to answer the two main questions; how effective has the GEF 
been as the financial mechanism for developing country implementation of the FCCC; 
and what factors can explain effectiveness and in what way. 
 
6.1.1 Effectiveness 
Regarding the first question, this thesis has shown that the effectiveness of GEF has 
varied according to different tasks and across the group of developing countries. The 
GEF has been effective in developing a variety of programs for project development, 
and in its allocation of financial resources based on these programs as seen by the 
project portfolio presented in chapter four. The “dual funding strategy” is in line with 
the objective and requirements of the convention. 
 
Concerning the outcome of these activities, the effectiveness of the GEF appear to 
vary both across the group of developing countries and depending on project type. 
Regarding the latter, this study found that the GEF has performed generally well in 
enabling countries to meet their reporting obligations. In terms of GEF’s contributions 
to increased capacity, this study has found that some countries have experienced a 
considerable increase in awareness and understanding of the climate change problem. 
In some cases this has led to improvements in energy efficiency and renewable energy. 
The outcomes of investment projects in other countries are varied or have yet to prove 
substantial results, as have GEFs efforts in regard to the development of new policies 
and frameworks in developing countries. Despite my reservations concerning an 
evaluation of the GEFs climate portfolio, it has proven difficult to make any definite 
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claims as to how effective the GEF is. The GEF does nevertheless appear to have 
achieved considerable more results in some countries, than other countries, and has 
been more effective in performing certain tasks, than others. Which brings me to the 
second question of this study, explaining effectiveness. 
 
6.1.2 Explaining Effectiveness 
The second question that I intended to answer in this study is, what factors can explain 
effectiveness and in what way. 
 
Problem-Solving Capacity 
In chapter one I mentioned that the effectiveness of an IGO is likely to increase over 
time because its operations becomes more standardized. This study has found that the 
GEF has not managed to develop a consistent procedure for project approval, and the 
incremental cost criterion has been the major obstacle to that process. The pragmatic 
approval procedure is an important factor in explaining the effectiveness of the GEF. 
Chapter five found that the GEF’s project cycle has become extremely long and that 
GEF-projects have not always been in line with the objective of the Convention. These 
findings contribute to explain why GEF outcomes are slow in emerging, in addition to 
the lack of private sector involvement in the GEF. Due to the difficulties encountered 
throughout the GEF project cycle, the private sector has found the GEF to be complex 
and time-consuming, and has therefore not played the expected important role in 
amplifying the outcomes of GEF-activities. 
 
Regarding the GEF’s achievements as of today, its varying effectiveness across the 
group of developing countries can to some extent be explained by the differences in 
countries’ understanding and knowledge of the GEF. According to the findings in 
chapter four and five, it appears to be a connection between countries’ understanding 
of GEF programmes and procedures and increases in capacity. In that regard, one 
should also take into account the level of funding available to the different countries. 
In terms of investment projects, project outcomes have generated more viable results 
in countries that both display a greater knowledge of GEF’s modalities and that have 
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received a larger share of the GEF’s resources. The countries in which GEF’s 
achievements have been moderate or small, they have had little knowledge of or/and 
understanding of the GEF. These countries have also received less funding, at least 
when compared to the high-emitting countries. The previous chapter found the GEF 
forums have not managed to function as a channel for information, and GEF’s reliance 
on the IAs and NGOs to inform developing countries about the GEF has not been 
sufficient, sometimes counterproductive. As mentioned above, this has had implication 
for GEF’s investment projects in these countries, it appears, however, to be less 
important in terms of explaining GEF’s efforts to enable these countries to prepare and 
submit their reports under the Convention. While this may be a consequence of the 
GEF’s strategy of covering the full costs of these activities, it may also be a 
consequence of the type of project. These activities are a more straightforward and less 
demanding operation, than stimulating political and market conditions for more 
climate friendly technology. Henceforth, the more or less effective reporting efforts of 
these countries, may be a consequence of both the less complex type of project and the 
resources available.  
 
Power and Instrumental Leadership 
The most powerful actor within the setting of GEF has been the US. As a powerful 
actor, this study has found the US to be somewhat of a laggard within the GEF. Not 
only by withholding payments, but also by forcing through a new debate on the 
allocation system for GEF funding. This study has found that the behaviour of the US 
has had a negative impact on GEF’s problem-solving capacity since the actions of the 
US have reopended the discussion on funding eligibility and by diverting attention 
away from the GEF’s role to enhance global environmental benefits within the 
Climate-regime.  
 
Another important finding, is the contribution of the GEF CEO. The Council members 
have become dependent on the CEO to ensure a more efficient duration of meetings. 
The decision-making capacity of the main GEF forum would probably have been 
significantly less without the skill and energy invested by El-Ashry. The CEO has 
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therefore been important in facilitating decision-making and paving the way for GEF 
activities. 
 
Problem Characteristics 
While identifying the problems associated with the climate change problem, it became 
evident that the problem is malign due to the highly asymmetrical distribution of costs 
and benefits. While I did not find that any clear evidence for developing country 
implementation being affected by the behaviour of other developing countries, I did 
find that their perception of the problem has been influenced by the fact that the 
majority of past and current emissions has originated in developed countries. One 
conclusion that can be drawn based on these findings, is that the climate change 
problem is not a priority for developing countries. Whether this is consequence of 
developing countries’ lack of interest, willingness or of ability to control emissions is 
difficult to assess, but these findings do, nevertheless, have ramifications for the 
GEF’s problem-solving capacity. The previous chapter found the GEF to be a 
compromise, and this appears to have had an impact on the extent to which it has been 
possible for the GEF to become a financial incentive for developing countries within 
the context of climate-cooperation. The climate change problem itself has not attracted 
sufficient developing country interest due to its relation to development and economic 
growth. The resources available through the GEF seem to be too small, at least to 
counteract the historical responsibility which developing countries place on the 
developed countries for causing the climate change problem. Within such a context, 
international environmental aid appears to have had little influence on developing 
countries’ positions in climate-cooperation. The GEF is perceived as just one amongst 
many donors in the field, functioning within a demanding and complex system.   
 
6.2 Theoretical Implications of the Findings 
In this section I will comment on theoretical variables and hypotheses outlined in the 
theoretical framework and discuss the fruitfulness of the approach of this study. 
   100 
6.2.1 The Dependent Variable  
Concerning the operationalisation of regime effectiveness into the two preceding 
phases of output and outcome, I find that this separation has been useful in measuring 
effectiveness over time. Output led me to focus on the initial stages of implementation, 
focusing on indicators that in turn paved the way for subsequent stages of regime 
operations. The utilization of two output-indicators provided me with points of 
reference to assess effectiveness; what the regime intended to do through program 
development, and what the regime actually did as seen by its project portfolio. 
Consequently I found output to be a valid tool for evaluating the preliminary stage of 
regime effectiveness. 
 
Regarding outcome, it was measured by using two different criteria, goal attainment 
and behavioural change. Whereas the measurement of goal attainment was a somewhat 
straightforward operation and as such a useful indicator of effectiveness, the 
measurement of behavioural change ran into some difficulties. The main obstacle for 
assessing the effectiveness of the GEF in terms of behavioural change has been that at 
the time of my evaluation the outcome of many GEF projects are more uncertain. The 
lack of data stemming from finalized projects does raise some feasibility concern to 
the application of regime effectiveness as a tool for analysing the GEF. I made an 
attempt to control for this by assessing effectiveness over time. The GEF is 
nevertheless an ongoing process, I would therefore like to emphasize that as the GEF 
climate change portfolio matures, the outcome of GEF operations may differ from my 
evaluation. It should be noted that the lack of data might itself be indicitative of how 
effective the GEF is. The GEF has, as of today, been in operation for more than ten 
years, and has been reviewed on numerous occasions, and the lack of findings can be 
interpreted as a sign of low effectiveness. I do, however, find that utilization of the two 
criteria for measuring the effectiveness has enabled me to assess different aspects of 
the GEF’s role as a financial mechanism for the FCCC.  
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6.2.2 The Independent Variables as Determinants of Effectiveness   
In the theoretical framework I made some assumptions and hypotheses concerning the 
impact of the different independent variables and factors on effectiveness. In this 
section I would like to see the extent to which this approach was valuable in 
explaining regime effectiveness. 
 
Problem-solving Capacity as a Determinant of Effectiveness
The findings highlighted in the previous pages have confirmed my assumption that an 
organization’s capacity may have an independent effect on the management of 
environmental problems. It has simultaneously confirmed that the management of 
environmental problems takes place within the framework of institutions that to a 
varying degree are capable of tackling such challenges.  
 
The institutional setting was considered to be an important determinant of effective 
implementation to the extent that it managed to aggregate actor preferences. I find that 
the flexible approach towards rules of access and decision-making procedures 
contributed to the development of programs. The exclusion of countries has been 
important in terms of decision-making. The hypothesis concerning the effect of 
decision-making rules has been confirmed, as the forum practicing rules with 
provisions (and an exclusionary approach to participation) has been the only forum 
managing to avoid issue-linking. The likelihood of being able to make decisions on 
programmes and projects in the absence of formal voting is small as aggregating actor 
preferences proved to be difficult in the global consensus forums. Consequently, this 
study has found that such a practice is a somewhat necessary condition for this 
organisation’s capacity to make decisions. Regarding participation, however, the 
hypothesis may not have stressed enough the role of target group participation. Their 
inclusion was considered important on the premise that their participation would 
provide them with information and enable them to develop a stake in the outcome. 
While all developing countries are to some extent involved in the GEF at project level, 
the exclusion of the majority of this group in the main forum has inhibited these 
countries’ ability to acquire the knowledge necessary for effective implementation. 
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This condition was expected to be particularly important in circumstances where the 
target group lacks the capacity to implement joint decisions. Indirect participation 
appears not to have been a sufficient practice of rules of access in this case. 
 
Regarding the last two determinants of problem-solving capacity, I find that the 
hypothesis regarding the effect of power to be confirmed. Concentration of power in 
the hands of laggards has had a negative effect on effectiveness. The hypotheses 
should nevertheless be somewhat modified. While there is no way of knowing whether 
a potential pusher would have enhanced effectiveness or not, the extent to which such 
a powerful actor could individually have rewarded other actors is to some extent 
limited. Due to the allocation system based on incremental costs, GEF funds are not 
sufficient in itself to provide powerful actors with the opportunity to significantly 
improve problem-capacity. But due to the scarcity of GEF funding, a laggard may 
have a more decisive effect, because of the GEF’s need for financial revenues. 
Furthermore, the laggard’s interest in emphasizing the role of other aspects than 
environmental benefits in the allocation process, may shift the main focus of the 
financial mechanism away from the purpose of convention implementation, and as 
such have a negative impact on effectiveness.  
 
Following the hypothesis concerning skill and energy, there was no questioning the 
impact of instrumental leadership on effectiveness per se. In terms of effectiveness, it 
was more a question of whether or not such leadership was in fact supplied. The need 
for and supply of instrumental leadership appear to be invertly related. The more 
demanding the decision rule and the more malign the problem, the higher the need for 
instrumental leadership. But under such conditions, supplying instrumental leadership 
becomes increasingly difficult. The GEF has proven to be dependent on such 
leadership even under less demanding decision making rules (consensus with formal 
provisions). Which leads me to believe that the instrumental leadership has been 
important in terms of effectiveness. 
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Although power, skill and energy can be easily separated when they are utilized as 
they have been by the different actors within the GEF setting, it is not always possible 
to distinguish their independent effect on problem-solving capacity. I made the 
theoretical proposition that power would have a stronger impact on actor behaviour 
than individual capacities. I find it difficult to verify this proposition with a high 
degree of certainty. Even though both forms of resources have been invested, the 
extent to which either one has been more important in terms of effectiveness is 
difficult to assess.  
 
Problem Characteristics as a Determinant of Effectiveness 
The variable of problem characteristics was dichotomised into benigness and 
maligness, in which the latter was expected to have a more profound impact on 
effectiveness than the former. Problem malignancy was found to increase the more the 
problem was characterized by an asymmetrical distribution of costs and benefits.  The 
variable of problem characteristics was mainly utilized to explain the given solution 
within the problem context it operates. This was a valuable approach to assess the 
degree by which problem malignancy affects the effectiveness of the solution. The 
malignancy of the problem required a more complex institutional arrangement, 
particularly in light of the actor’s different opinions regarding the distribution of costs. 
The discrepancies in actors’ preferences are also prevailing in their perception of the 
solution as a compromise, and have had implication for their involvement throughout 
the implementation process. I find that the institutional arrangements have not 
sufficient affected actor utility in favour of implementation. Consequently, one can 
draw the conclusion that effective solutions are particularly hard to design in case of 
malign problems. 
 
Regarding the two independent variables, I find that both have been important in terms 
of explaining effectiveness. The variable of problem-solving capacity was especially 
valuable as it enabled me to look at some of the strengths and pitfalls of GEF’s 
institutional setting, together with the disadvantages of powerful actors and advantages 
of the skill and energy invested by the instrumental leaders. The second variable was 
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important as it managed to shed some additional light on the limitations that problem 
characteristics placed on GEF’s problem-solving capacity, and GEF’s ability to play 
an enabling role within the regime. The attempt to match problem-solving capacity 
with problem type and task became an increasingly important determinant of 
effectiveness in this study. 
 
Main Approach  
The approach aimed at understanding the operations of the GEF based on the data 
available and the operationalisation of the theoretical variables. In terms of the GEF’s 
effectiveness as a financial mechanism in general, this study is limited to the GEF and 
the FCCC. While the GEF does serve as the financial mechanism for other 
environmental conventions, I am not in a position to generalize over its performance in 
contributing to the management of other environmental problems. It could possibly be 
argued that since it is operating within the same institutional setting and under the 
same core organizational characteristics, one might expect it to function in more or 
less the same way. But it should nevertheless be noted that it would be difficult to 
make any reliable comments without having controlled for the other environmental 
problems.  
 
Another limitation of this approach was the decision to focus on the GEF. Some of the 
findings of this study do indicate that the IAs do play important roles in the GEF, and 
have contributed to determining effectiveness. While I do consider my decision to be 
important for the purpose of keeping within the limits of a master study, I 
simultaneously recognize that IAs’ operations within the setting of the GEF is well 
worth a study. 
 
6.3 Final Remarks 
Having summed up the main findings of this study, I would like to make a few 
comments on the GEF and what the future might hold for this unique facility. The 
GEF has since its inception been under constant change and evolution. Being launched 
as a lofty new initiative for environmental aid and cooperation, it was to some extent 
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bound to run into challenges it had to adapt to. Some of the difficulties envisaged in 
this study can therefore possibly be “teething problems”. The GEF in its current setting 
is attempting to target some of the shortcomings that it has faced so far as seen by the 
Country Dialogue Workshops. While I do agree with Haas et al. (1993:17) when they 
claim that it is foolish to have blind faith in treaties,90 I simultaneously think that one 
can rightfully claim that regimes and their financial mechanisms are, at the very least, 
contributing to the management of environmental problems.  
 
Regarding what the future might hold for the GEF, there have been new additions to 
both the GEF-family and the Trust Fund. Regarding the former, many developing 
country representatives appear to be positive towards the inclusion of additional 
agencies, the Executing Agencies (Developing countries interviews.2003). In addition, 
the FCCC has decided that three new funds should be established, and managed by the 
GEF, to target more specific aspects of the implementation of the Climate Change 
Convention in developing countries91. Furthermore, the status of the climate change 
problem in international relations may be at the point of changing with the Kyoto 
Protocol having recently entered into force (February 16th, 2005). International climate 
cooperation may be revived due to developed countries commitment to control their 
ghgs-emissions under the Protocol. If these additional developments materialize into 
substantial climate change activities, this may have implications for the effectiveness 
of the financial mechanism serving the climate regime. These questions are, however, 
not to be answered by this study.  
 
                                                 
90 Haas et al. (ibid) claim that there are good reasons for healthy critisism regarding the ability of international 
institutions to solve environmental problems, since they claim that states maintain control; the institutions 
themselves are typically quite weak.  
91 These three funds are: a special climate fund, a least developing country fund, and an adaption fund. 
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Appendix 1 The Constituencies of the GEF Council92
 
Single Constituencies  Canada 
developed countries France 
 Germany 
 Japan 
 The Netherlands 
 Italy 
 UK 
 United States 
Multiconstituencies   
developed countries 
 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
Mixed constituencies Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Turkey 
 Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway 
 Estonia, Finland, Sweden 
 Australia, New Zealand, Republic of Korea 
 Armenia, Belarus, Russian Federation 
 Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Tadjikistan, Switzerland, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
 Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Macedonia, Poland, 
Romania, Ukraine 
Single Constituencies  
developing countries 
 
China 
 Iran 
Multiconstituencies  
developing countries 
 
Afghanistan, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, Syria 
 Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador  
 Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Kitts & 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad 
and Tobago 
 Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Senegal, The Gambia 
 Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia 
 Cambodia, D.P.R. Korea, Lao, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, 
Thailand, Vietnam 
 Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay 
 Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka 
 Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda 
 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Venezuela 
 Benin, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo 
                                                 
92 http://gefweb.org/participants/Council/council_members/council_members.html 22.05.3005 
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 Cook Islands, Fiji, Indonesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, 
Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu 
 Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, DR of Congo 
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Appendix 2 Overview of Countries contributions to the GEF Trust Fund 
 
The numbers represent countries contributions made in percentage of their pledged 
contributions. The numbers that are in parentheses are contributions made through co-
financing and not to the core fund. For the countries currently in arrears, their payments 
actually made to the GET, are given in per centage of their pledged contribution. 
 
 
Country 
 
Pilot 
programme93  
GEF 1 1994  GEF 2 1997 GEF 3 2002 
Argentina/USD  5.00 / 50% - - 
Australia/AUD 0.00 (17.71 SDR) 42.76 43.27  68.16 / 25% 
Austria/EUR 26.05 SDR 16.82 16.80  24.82 / 25% 
Bangladesh/SDR  2.00  - - 
Belgium/EUR  27.27  30.94  41.98 / 25% 
Brazil/SDR 4.00 SDR 4.00  - - 
Canada/CAD  111.11  141.66  158.94 / 25% 
China/SDR 4.00 SDR 4.00  6.00  7.50 / 25% 
Cote d’Ivoire/SDR  4.00  4.00  4.00 / 100% 
CzechRepublic SDR  4.00  4.00  4.00 /25% 
Denmark/SDR 16.25 SDR 25.08  193.16 DKK 298.18DKK/ 100% 
Egypt/SDR 4.00 SDR 4.00 /47% - - 
Finland/EUR 20.44 SDR 20.86  14.89  30.00 / 40% 
France/EUR 114.33 SDR 122.98  131.50 164.00 / 25% 
Germany/SDR 110.05 SDR 171.30  198.99  293.67 / 25% 
Greece/USD  5.00  4.50 EUR  5.73 EUR / 25% 
India/SDR 4.00 SDR 6.00  323.83INR  426.39INR/ 25% 
Ireland/EUR  2.08  4.69  5.73 / 25% 
Italy/EUR 65.10 SDR 82.53  73.85 / 66% No IOC* 
Japan/JPY 7.32 (100.00 SDR) 45,698.08  45,754.33  48,754.33 / 25% 
Korea/SDR  4.00  4,933.67KRW 5.51USD / 50% 
Luxembourg/SDR  4.00  4.97 EUR  NO IOC* 
Mexico/SDR 4.00 SDR 4.00  4.00  5.07USD / 25% 
Netherlands/SDR 37.74 SDR 50.97  53.05  62.39 / 0 % 
New Zealand /NZD  10.35 8.31  12.14 / 25% 
Nigeria/SDR  - 4.00  4.00 / 0% 
Norway/NOK 19.57 SDR 220  228.32  228.32 / 25% 
Pakistan/EUR 4.00 SDR 4.00  4.00 / 75% NO IOC* 
                                                 
93 Both Indonesia  and Marocco contributed 4.00 SDR to the pilot GEF, but since they have not contributed to 
the restructured GEF they have not been included in this presentation.  
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Portugal/EUR  4.45  4.90  5.73 / 25% 
Slovakia SDR  4.00  - - 
Slovenia/SDR  - 1.00  1.00 /25% 
Spain/EUR 10.00 SDR 13.10  14.81  21.67 / 0% 
Sweden/SEK 24.54 250.04  448.07  764.67 / 100% 
Switzerland/SDR 30.06  (109.49 SDR) 31.97  64.38CHF  99.07CHF / 50% 
Turkey/SDR 4.00 SDR 4.00  4.00  4.00 / 25% 
UK/GBP 54.78  89.55  85.25 117.83 / 25% 
USA/USD 0.00 (109.49 SDR) 430.00  430.00  500.00/ 22% 
 
 
No IOC* means that the country have not yet submitted an Instrument of Commitment for GEF-3. 
 
